The sense of agency by Gentsch, Antje
The Sense of Agency:  
Neural and Cognitive Correlates of the Self in Action 
 
D i s s e r t a t i o n  
 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades  
doctor rerum naturalium (Dr. rer. nat.) 
 
im Fach Psychologie 
 
eingereicht am 07.09.2011 an der 
Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät II 
der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
 
von 
Dipl.-Psych. Antje Gentsch 
 
 
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz 
 
Dekan der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät II 
Prof. Dr. Elmar Kulke 
 
Gutachter/Gutachterin  
1. Prof. Dr. Norbert Kathmann 
2. Dr. Simone Schütz-Bosbach 
3. Prof. Dr. Thomas Goschke 
 






Meiner Betreuerin Dr. Simone Schütz-Bosbach danke ich für die Möglichkeit in ihrer 
Forschungsgruppe an diesem Projekt zu arbeiten, für ihre Hilfe bei der konzeptionellen 
Ausrichtung meiner Arbeit und die finanzielle Unterstützung. 
Ich danke meinem Betreuer Prof. Norbert Kathmann für seine Beratung und Unterstützung 
während der Promotion. Bei Prof. Michael Pauen möchte ich mich für die Gespräche 
bedanken und bei Prof. Thomas Goschke für seine Zeit zur Begutachtung der Dissertation. 
Der Berlin School of Mind and Brain danke ich für die Finanzierung meiner Doktorarbeit und 
die anregenden Veranstaltungen und Weiterbildungsangebote während des 
Promotionsstudiums. 
Mein herzlicher Dank gilt meinen Kollegen am Max-Planck-Institut in Leipzig für die 
freundliche und produktive Arbeitsatmosphäre und die stete Diskussionsbereitschaft – allen 
voran den Doktoranden und Postdoktoranden der Forschungsgruppe „Body and Self“. Jeanine 
Auerswald, Jan Bergmann, und Loreen Hertäg danke ich für die Unterstützung bei 
technischen Fragen, Programmierung und Datenerhebung, und Rosie Wallis für das 
Korrekturlesen und Lektorat der englischen Fachartikel. Weiterhin möchte ich meinen 
Kollegen an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin danken, vor allem Dr. Tanja Endrass für ihre 
Unterstützung bei der Durchführung der Patientenstudie, sowie Ulrike Bunzenthal und Rainer 
Kniesche für die Hilfe bei der Datenerhebung. Bei John Bateman bedanke ich mich für das 
Korrekturlesen und Lektorat meiner Dissertation. 
Meinen Freunden danke ich für ihre Geduld, Empathie und Ermutigung in schwierigen 
Phasen der Arbeit. 











1 General Introduction 1 
 1.1 What is the sense of agency?  1 
  1.1.1  The problem of perceiving causality  1 
  1.1.2  Feeling versus judging: the phenomenology of agency  2 
  1.1.3  Construing a sense of self  3 
 1.2 Cues to agency  4 
  1.2.1  Motor signals  5 
  1.2.2  Prior thoughts  6 
  1.2.3  Integration of multiple cues  7 
 1.3 Measures of the sense of agency  9 
  1.3.1  Agency judgments as an explicit measure  9 
  1.3.2  Sensory attenuation as an implicit measure  9 
 1.4 Pathologies of the sense of agency: Obsessive compulsive disorder 11 
    
2 Summary of Experimental Studies 14 
 2.1 General objectives  14 
 2.2 Summary of Study 1  15 
 2.3 Summary of Study 2  16 
 2.4 Summary of Study 3  17 
    
3 General Discussion 19 
 3.1 Attenuation in sensory perception and the sense of agency 19 
 3.2 Optimal integration of agency cues 22 
 3.3 A disturbed sense of agency in obsessive-compulsive disorder  25 
 3.4 Caveats and considerations  27 
 3.5 Future directions  29 
    
4 Manuscript of Study 1  
 “I did it: Unconscious Expectation of Sensory Consequences Modulates the 





VI   |  Contents 
 
    
5 Manuscript of Study 2  
 “Reliability of Sensory Predictions Determines the Experience of Self-Agency” 59 
    
6 Manuscript of Study 3  




    
References (Chapter 1-3)  107 
Appendix A. List of Figures and Tables  116 
Appendix B. List of Abbreviations  119 
Erklärung über die selbständige Abfassung der Arbeit  121 




   
1 General Introduction
1.1   What is the sense of agency?
The sense of agency refers to the human ability to perceive causality, in particular, causality 
between the mind and the body or between the body and the external world (Gallagher, 2000). 
More specifically, the sense of agency is a person’s feeling that he or she can cause and 
control his or her own actions and produce, through them, changes in the external world. 
1.1.1 The problem of perceiving causality
In our daily life it seems natural to us that we are the ones causing the motion of our body 
when we walk or when we grasp an apple. We also know, without thinking about it, that our 
actions produce specific effects, for example, that a light turns on when we press the light 
switch or that certain sounds occur when we utter our name or when we close a door. We 
have the experience of a coherent link from our thoughts, to our body movements, to the 
external effects in the world, which brings about a feeling of control of these events.
However, in fact, we are unable to consciously track the causal chain between our conscious 
will and the resulting bodily or external effects since we are not aware of many aspects of our 
mental or physical actions (e.g., Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Libet, 1985). As David Hume 
1748 already noted, “The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this 
we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by 
which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being 
immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry” (Hume, 1748; 
2007, p.47). In the light of this skeptical view of causation, the fundamental question arises 
that if we cannot possess knowledge about causal processes, then how can we experience 
causality, and specifically, how does the capacity emerge for experiencing ourselves as causal 
agents. For instance, what makes us feel that we can control the movement of our eyes or legs 
better than the contraction of our heart or the size of our pupil? How do we know that a light 
turning on somewhere in a room was in fact related to our button push on the wall? Why do 
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some patients with schizophrenia have the experience that their own actions are controlled by 
external forces?
During the last decade the sense of agency has become an increasingly prominent 
interdisciplinary research topic (for reviews, see Balconi, 2010; David, Newen, & Vogeley, 
2008) in the field of psychology (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Sato & Yasuda, 
2005), philosophy (e.g., de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004; Gallagher, 2000; Pacherie, 2008; 
Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a), neuroscience (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 
1998; Chaminade & Decety, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003), psychiatry (e.g., Daprati et al., 1997; 
Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000b; Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007) and neurology (e.g., 
Farrer, Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003; Moore et al., 2010). Nevertheless, a thorough 
understanding of this cognitive function is still lacking because the diversity of 
conceptualizations, paradigms and measures of agency is huge. It is this very diversity which 
makes the development of a comprehensive account more difficult.
The present research aims at elucidating some processes behind the experience of agency by 
combining behavioral and neural measures and by targeting different underlying cognitive 
operations. The complex phenomenology of the sense of agency suggests that it is not based 
on a single cortical source but evolves out of the combination of multiple cues and a 
distributed network of processing modules. Furthermore, a case of a possible disturbance of 
agency as it is apparent in the phenomenology of obsessive-compulsive disorder will be 
considered in order to study a selective breakdown and work out the details of the agency 
system.
1.1.2 Feeling versus judging: the phenomenology of agency
When we talk about a sense of agency, that is, the perception of self-causality we are not 
referring to a single, circumscribed experience but to a category composed of distinct, 
separable experiential dimensions. In particular, two dimensions have been distinguished, the 
feeling and judgment of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a, 2008b).
The feeling of agency represents a non-conceptual experience of self-causality. It is present as 
a diffuse background feeling of coherent sensory-motor and motor-sensory flow. A sound, for 
example, is perceived as being coupled to one’s action in an implicit way, without 
consciously reflecting about it. That is, the feeling of agency is not based on a conscious 
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decision about what might be the most plausible cause of a sound, but an event is merely 
automatically classified as being caused by one’s action or not. A disturbance at this level 
may show up in feelings of incompleteness or doubts about actions. For example, a person 
may have the sensation when locking a door that the door is not locked just right or when 
talking to people that the words do not sound just right, as observed in patients with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Rheaume, 2003).
The judgment of agency, in contrast, is a conceptual, attributive explanation of self-causality: 
the potential causes of a sensory event such as a sound are taken into account and a belief is 
formed about the origins of that sound and the degree of personal influence. A disturbance at 
this level of belief formation may be reflected in auditory hallucinations of patients with 
schizophrenia (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007), in delusional beliefs that one’s body is 
controlled by an external agent (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008a) or in anarchic limb phenomena and anosognosia for hemiparesis (Synofzik, Vosgerau, 
& Newen, 2008b). 
In our everyday life, the feeling of agency is more prevalent than the judgment of agency: 
when we act a feeling of motor-sensory flow is constantly present and only in cases of 
discrepancy or in unfamiliar contexts (e.g., during the acquisition of new skills) we 
consciously monitor and judge our causal influence. Current research on the sense of agency, 
however, does not do justice to this fact but, to the contrary, so far mostly explicit measures 
are used which capture the judgment level of agency only (see also chapter 1.3.1). In the 
present work, both the feeling and judgment of agency are investigated empirically, and the 
umbrella term sense of agency (or agency experience) is used to subsume both experiential 
dimensions.
1.1.3 Construing a sense of self
The sense of agency is considered an essential feature of self-consciousness, in particular, it 
refers to the awareness of the results of the self in action (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998; 
Knoblich, Elsner, Aschersleben, & Metzinger, 2003). What has been recognized for 
experiences and thoughts is also true for actions in that they do “…not just occur in a free-
floating way, like clouds in the sky, but seem to originate from—and within—a thinking self, 
a self somehow mentally portrayed as an independent cause in itself, a cognitive agent” 
(Knoblich, Elsner, Aschersleben, & Metzinger, 2003, p.487). 
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An important distinction has been drawn between two variants of self-consciousness: First, 
the “minimal self” (Gallagher, 2000; or "physical self", Gillihan & Farah, 2005; or "embodied 
self", Jeannerod, 2007) refers to the (non-conscious) awareness of one’s own body or action 
during a particular bodily event. It is thought to be composed of the feeling of agency along 
with the sense of ownership for body parts (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Gallagher, 2007). A second variety of the self is the “narrative self” (Gallagher, 2000; or 
"psychological self", Gillihan & Farah, 2005) involving autobiographical memory and beliefs 
about one’s traits and attitudes which continue and develop across time and experiences. The 
judgment of agency may be considered a source for the “narrative self”, in particular, for 
personal beliefs about (moral) responsibility (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b) as well 
as self-efficacy and self-esteem, as an attitude toward the self (Bandura, 1982, 2001; Skinner, 
1996).
Synofzik and colleagues (2008b) consider personal beliefs about responsibility to be a meta-
representation of the self, in particular, a representation of its capacity to influence the body 
and (through the body) the external world. It is thought to form the highest cognitive 
dimension of agency experience. A disturbance at this level is reflected in exaggerated belief 
of responsibility for preventing negative events for example in obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(Moulding & Kyrios, 2006; Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999). The ascription 
of self-responsibility has been proposed to depend on an individual’s awareness of a will 
underlying the action, the potential action outcomes, contextual barriers and, in the case of 
moral responsibility, social norms (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b). 
1.2   Cues to agency
The perception of causality in general has been shown to rely on the detection of spatio-
temporal correlations between two events A and B, for example the movement of an object A 
and the movement of an object B (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Michotte, 1963; Shanks & 
Dickinson, 1987). Agency as a special case of causation differs in that event A is oneself, that 
is the will, and event B is the bodily movement, or alternatively, event A is the bodily 
movement (e.g., pushing a button on the phone) and event B is an event in the external world 
(e.g., a sound). That is, in both cases the observation of event A consists of a representation of 
self-related information, namely the will or the movement command, which is accessible prior 
and in addition to the perception of external effects. Two models of agency have received 
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extensive empirical support, the comparator model (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a) and 
the theory of apparent mental causation (Wegner, 2003). The theories differ with respect to 
the emphasis on motor signals or thoughts (e.g., intentions) as the content of the reference 
event (A) that is used for establishing a causal relation with the effect (event B). 
1.2.1 Motor signals
The comparator model or predictive account (see Fig. 1; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; for a critical 
discussion see Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a) claims that the sense of agency depends 
on a comparison between predictions made by an internal model of the motor system, a so-
called forward model and sensory signals resulting from the corresponding action (Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a; Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998; Sperry, 1950; von Holst & 
Mittelstaedt, 1950): a concordance between predictions and sensory signals would be the cue 
to attribute the observed effects to an internal source, a mismatch would lead to an external 
attribution. 
The impact of motor predictions on the sense of agency has been demonstrated using different 
measures of agency such as explicit judgments (e.g., Sato & Yasuda, 2005), sensorimotor 
attenuation (e.g., Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Lindner, Thier, Kircher, Haarmeier, & 
Leube, 2005) or intentional binding (e.g., Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010; for a 
description of measures, see chapter 1.3). However, since internal motor signals operate 
primarily at an automatic level and have been demonstrated to be poorly accessible to 
conscious awareness, they are more accurately reflected in implicit measures such as 
kinematics than explicit judgments of action (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Georgieff & 
Jeannerod, 1998). Typical experimental approaches for studying motor predictions include the 
gradual distortion of action feedback in time or space (e.g., Leube et al., 2003), the 
comparison of active and passive movements (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2007) 
or the variation of outcome probability (e.g., Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009). 
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Figure 1.1. The comparator model of the sense of agency. This model is based on a framework of the 
motor control system that postulates three different representational states of the system: the intended 
state, the predicted state and the actual state. During action, a forward model based on action-related 
signals predicts the sensory consequences of the action. This sensory prediction is used for online 
control of movements (comparator 1) and for cancellation of sensory input that is self-produced 
(comparator 3). The actual sensory consequences of an action can be used for feedback-based goal-
directed learning (comparator 2). Adapted from Synofzik (2008a).
1.2.2 Prior thoughts
The theory of apparent mental causation or inferential account (Wegner, 2003; Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999), in contrast, holds that agency is experienced only when one infers that an 
action was caused by one’s own thought preceding the action. This inference is assumed to 
occur according to three principles: the thought appears prior to the action (priority), is 
consistent with the action (consistency) and no alternative causes are present (exclusivity). 
Experiments testing this theory typically use priming to manipulate the content of thoughts 
prior to an action. Priming refers to a change in the ability to process a stimulus (e.g., the 
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sensory consequence of an action) as a result of a specific prior experience with the same, or a 
related, stimulus (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). The enhancing effect on the sense of agency has 
been shown for auditory priming (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999) as well as for visual priming (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Linser & 
Goschke, 2007). Most of these studies used explicit agency judgments but some also 
employed implicit measures such as sensorimotor attenuation (e.g., Sato, 2009) and 
intentional binding (e.g., Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that both subliminal stimuli and supraliminal stimuli are equally effective, meaning that 
agency experience can be influenced by conscious and unconscious anticipatory 
representations of the action effect (Linser & Goschke, 2007). This suggests an underlying 
automatic process for which prior thoughts need not be conscious to serve as a reference 
signal for inferring agency.
1.2.3 Integration of multiple cues
Instead of being mutually exclusive, however, the two models described above should be 
considered as complementing each other. Recent integrative frameworks assume that multiple 
cues contribute to the sense of agency depending on the level of representation, for example 
feeling versus judgment of agency (see Fig. 2, Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a, 2008b), 
or on the level of intention, distal, proximal or motor intention (Pacherie, 2008). 
Synofzik and colleagues (2008b) propose that at a lower level, motor predictions and 
reafferent feedback from vision and proprioception (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) are necessary 
conditions for a feeling of agency. At a higher level, judgments of agency are formed by 
integrating these low-level sensorimotor signals into a cognitive system of intentions and 
personal theories that are based on prior experience in certain psychosocial contexts and 
cultural knowledge (see also Young, 1995). It has been further proposed that these different 
agency cues are optimally combined to obtain the most robust estimate of self-causality 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009). In particular, it is assumed that different cues may 
outweigh or even substitute each other depending on their relative reliability and availability 
in a certain context (Moore, 2009). For example, the presence of potential alternative agents 
may change the weighting of internal signals: when a nearby glass falls on the floor, the fact 
of being alone in the room may be informative enough, whereas internal sensorimotor cues 
would receive more weight if other people were around. 
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Evidence for optimal cue integration underlying the sense of agency is still scarce, in 
particularly concerning the interaction of cognitive cues (such as prior thoughts or context) 
with sensorimotor signals. One goal of the present research was to shed light on the 
mechanisms of cue integration at different levels of agency processing.
Figure 1.2. The account of an optimal cue integration underlying the sense of agency. This framework 
assumes that a combination and integration of multiple cues provides the basis for a robust and 
flexible agency experience in variable contexts. Two representational levels of agency experience are 
distinguished: the feeling of agency and the judgment of agency. The weighting process of cognitive, 
perceptual and motor cues is thought to differ between the two levels. Adapted from Synofzik (2008a)
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1.3   Measures of the sense of agency
Current experimental measures and paradigms also are highly diverse due to different 
operational definitions of the concept of agency. Two different approaches can be 
distinguished: explicit measures involving verbal judgments of agency and implicit measures 
capturing phenomenological and neural reflections of agency.
1.3.1 Agency judgments as an explicit measure
Judgments of agency are typically assessed following free- or forced choice button presses or 
simple movements (e.g., a single-finger extension, hand gestures or rotations of a joystick). In 
some studies, participants are asked to indicate the degree of felt control or intention for such 
actions (Linser & Goschke, 2007; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999) or to attribute a visual action effect to a particular agent, for example to 
themselves, the computer or another person (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Sato, 2009; 
Sato & Yasuda, 2005). Typically these judgments are made on visual analogue scales (10-
points or 100-points) ranging from not at all me to absolutely me, or from I allowed it to 
happen to I intended to make it, or from no control to complete control. In other studies, 
participants have to judge the image of a movement displayed on a computer screen. These 
judgments typically involve Yes or No to indicate whether the image was spatio-temporally 
concordant with their own movement (Farrer, Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003; Leube et 
al., 2003) or whether they saw their hand or someone else’s hand on the screen (Daprati et al., 
1997; Sirigu, Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 1999; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).
However, as stated earlier, explicit measures are not able to capture the content of the agency 
experience that accompanies most of our everyday actions, namely the feeling of harmonious 
flow from our thoughts to our actions to the sensory consequences in the world which induces 
a sense of effectiveness and completion during an action (see chapter 1.1.2). Aspects of this 
feeling of agency can be targeted by different implicit measures.
1.3.2 Sensory attenuation as an implicit measure
An implicit measure has the potential to access mechanisms of automatic information 
processing underlying a cognitive function more directly than subjective judgments. Different 
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implicit measures of the sense of agency have been proposed: The kinematics of a movement, 
for example, can reveal the properties of an underlying action program and monitoring 
mechanism which cannot be verbally reported. For example, the detection of small deviations 
of an outcome from an intended action outcome may be reflected in adjustments of movement 
that remain unconscious (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Knoblich & Kircher, 2004). 
Intentional binding is another implicit measure which captures representations of the temporal 
relation between actions and effects. For example, the perceived timing of an external effect 
changes (i.e., it is perceived as occurring earlier) specifically if the effect follows a voluntary 
action which aims at producing it (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). In the focus of the 
present research, however, there is yet another implicit measure which has been termed 
sensory attenuation (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; or alternatively: sensorimotor 
attenuation, sensory suppression, sensory gating, corollary discharge signal or reafference 
principle) and will be described in more detail in the following.
Sensory attenuation is the product of a physiological mechanism that specifically predicts and 
filters the consequences of one’s own actions, for example the sensory input to the skin when 
one is grasping a glass of water. Von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) pointed out that it reflects 
a distinctive feature of “reafference” (i.e., sensory input resulting from one’s own 
movements), as compared to “exafference” (i.e., sensory input resulting from occurrences in 
the environment): reafferent input cancels and neutralizes with an “efference copy” (i.e., a 
copy of the motor command) or a corollary discharge (Sperry, 1950) that is issued to the 
sensory pathway. This mechanism allows the central nervous system to resolve the confusion 
between simultaneous reafferent and exafferent input during movement, and it has been 
described for various species and different sensory modalities (Crapse & Sommer, 2008).
The result of this cancellation in vision, for example, is the impression of a stable external 
world despite the constantly changing visual input caused by our eye movements (e.g., Wurtz, 
2011). In the perception of touch, an example is the phenomenon that one cannot tickle 
oneself (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Weiskrantz, Elliott, & Darlington, 1971): 
specifically, self-produced tactile stimulation is perceived as being less tickly, intense and 
pleasant than an identical stimulus produced externally. In this way, self-generated sensory 
events are associated with a specific perceptual quality. Modern views of this principle 
proposed by von Holst and Sperry include a forward model which captures the causal 
relations between movements and their bodily or environmental outcomes and thereby serves 
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as a predictor of sensory input (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & 
Jordan, 1995). These internal predictions are used for fine adjustments to ongoing motor 
commands, and they can also be used for a comparison with the actual sensory effects of 
movement which are attenuated in case of a match. Since the comparison between predicted 
and actual sensory input lies at the core of the comparator model of the sense of agency (e.g., 
Sato & Yasuda, 2005; see chapter 1.2.1), sensory attenuation, in the light of this model, can 
be considered the primary measure for agency experience.
Various methods have been used for measuring sensory attenuation such as psychophysical 
perceptual estimates (e.g., Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999) and behavioral measures (e.g., 
Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003) as well as recordings of neural activity (e.g., Houde, 
Nagarajan, Sekihara, & Merzenich, 2002). In the present research, we used event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) of electrophysiological recordings in which sensory attenuation has been 
repeatedly observed around 100 ms following the occurrence of a self-produced sensory 
event, specifically, in the N1 component (Ford & Mathalon, 2004; Heinks-Maldonado et al., 
2007; Lange, 2011; Schafer & Marcus, 1973). Furthermore, the implicit measure of sensory 
attenuation was combined with an explicit measure of causality judgment in order to gain a 
broader and more comprehensive picture of the sense of agency, its subcomponents and their 
possible impairment in obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
1.4   Pathologies of the sense of agency: Obsessive-compulsive disorder
There are different pathological disruptions of agency. Typically, schizophrenia patients with 
delusions of control have been discussed in this context (e.g., Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 
2000b) but also neurological symptoms, including anarchic limb sign or anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (e.g., Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b). The focus of the present research is 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, a pathology that has so far been largely neglected.
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by recurrent thoughts that are 
unwanted, distressing and insistent (i.e., obsessions), and urges to perform mental or physical 
acts repeatedly, in ritualistic, stereotyped succession (i.e., compulsions), both of which 
significantly impair everyday functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
Common contents of obsessive thoughts involve self-doubt (e.g., whether a certain behavior 
was done, and done just right, such as turning off the stove), contamination (e.g., that hands 
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are still dirty after washing them) and symmetry (e.g., that objects are not lined up properly). 
Common compulsive acts include repeated checking (e.g., going back over a behavior such as 
turning off the stove repeatedly), washing (e.g., excessive washing of hands) or ordering (e.g., 
to line up the books on the shelf over and over). Compulsions are considered responses to 
particular obsessions aiming to relief the negative affect (i.e., anxiety, uncertainty) or to 
prevent harm to oneself or others which might be related to obsessions. 
Cognitive theories of obsessions suggest that beliefs about responsibility for causing or 
preventing harm are a critical factor in the maintenance of compulsions and other forms of 
neutralizing behavior (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999). 
However, recently it has been criticized that existing research has focused too strongly on 
patients’ cognition about intrusions or on overt neutralizing behavior and has largely 
neglected a phenomenological approach for understanding OCD (Ecker, 2002). The 
phenomenology of obsessions and compulsions refers to the subjective inner experience 
during symptom expression which is often difficult to verbalize. An example is the experience 
of dissatisfaction and incompleteness related to an action and the “need for experiences to 
conform to exact, yet often inexpressible criteria” (Summerfeldt, 2004, p.1156).
The role of incompleteness feelings in the phenomenology of OCD has already been 
recognized 1903 by Pierre Janet (Pitman, 1987b) and recently been re-conceptualized as “not 
just right experiences” (Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Rheaume, 2003) or as persistent internal 
error signals and impressions of something being wrong with an action (Aouizerate et al., 
2004; Pitman, 1987a; Schwartz, 1998). In fact, neuroimaging research confirmed 
hyperactivity of brain regions sensitive to response errors and conflict, specifically in basal 
ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops involving the medial frontal cortex (MFC), that is, the anterior 
cingulate cortex and premotor regions (e.g., Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Saxena, 
Brody, Schwartz, & Baxter, 1998; Ursu, Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter, 2003; Yucel et al., 
2007). These results indicate a dysfunction in the processing of action outcomes in OCD.
Established models of motor control, however, indicate that several kinds of motor 
representations and monitoring processes take place to evaluate actions and their outcomes 
(Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a; Wolpert, 1997; see Fig. 1). A first comparator monitors 
for goal-achievement using representations of the intended and predicted action outcome. A 
second comparator enables feedback-based action learning based on representations of the 
intended and actual outcome. A third comparator evaluates the precision of forward model 
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predictions and reflects the degree of causation and control (i.e., agency) for an outcome. 
These different components of motor control have been related to different neural systems 
(Krigolson & Holroyd, 2006; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000), however, OCD research so far 
exclusively focused on comparators 1 and 2. In order to gain a more comprehensive and 
complete picture of the outcome processing deficit in OCD, the functional integrity of 
forward models underlying the third comparator should be investigated. Abnormalities in this 
specific monitoring mechanism would indicate a disturbed feeling of agency as suggested by 
the phenomenological feature of incompleteness in these patients. 
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2.1   General objectives  
The overall aim, which was characteristic for all studies that contributed to the present work, 
was to combine explicit and implicit measures for investigating processes underlying feelings 
and judgments of agency respectively. Typically, research exploring the mechanisms by 
which the experience of oneself as an agent is generated focuses only on one particular aspect 
of agency, namely, the way people make explicit attributions about who or what might be the 
most plausible cause for a sensory event in a given situation. These explicit judgments, 
however, do not reflect the feeling of agency which accompanies our actions by default and 
which can be accessed only by indirect, implicit measures that are not based on verbal reports 
or conscious decisions. 
A second general objective across the different studies that were conducted was to test 
predictions of a recent integrative account of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009; 
Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b), for which evidence is still scarce. As described in 
chapter 1.2.3, this theory proposes a weighting and integration of different agency cues 
depending on their relative reliability and depending on whether a feeling or judgment of 
agency is formed. In two subsequent studies (Study 1 and 2) involving healthy participants the 
integration of three important agency cues was investigated: first, the presence of motor 
signals, second, anticipations due to prior thoughts and, third, the availability of precise motor 
predictions.   
A third important objective of this research was to explore mechanisms of agency formation 
in individuals suffering from OCD, which was realized in Study 3. Until now, no 
investigation of the sense of agency has been conducted in a clinical population of OCD 
patients, despite its phenomenological plausibility and despite the possibility to gain a broader 
view on the motor control deficit that has often been implicated in this disorder (e.g., Gehring, 
Himle, & Nisenson, 2000). Furthermore, studying psychopathological conditions in which 
particular aspects of the sense of agency are disturbed may provide deeper insights into the 
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nature and interrelation of different components of the agency experience, such as 
sensorimotor and higher-order cognitive processes. 
2.2   Summary of Study 1 
Prior thoughts have been proposed to act as an important agency cue if they concord with the 
action outcome. Although this has been demonstrated for explicit judgments of agency, little 
is known at the level of feeling of agency about the effects of such cognitive cues in general 
and how they interact with sensorimotor cues. The objective of Study 1 was to examine the 
influence of both prior thoughts and motor signals on sensory attenuation, a marker of the 
feeling of agency in early sensory processing of action outcomes. ERPs were recorded while 
participants performed a causality judgment task in which visual sensory effects were either 
produced by an action or by the computer. Prior thoughts were manipulated by subliminally 
priming the visual effect prior to action with congruent, incongruent or neutral stimuli. Study 
participants were 20 healthy subjects recruited from the general community, and the 
experiment was conducted at Max-Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, 
Leipzig. The main outcome measures included causality judgments on a visual analogue scale 
ranging from 0 (“no control”) to 100 (“full control”) and the visual N1 component relative to 
the occurrence of the visual effect. 
Our results revealed a reduction in amplitude of the visual anterior N1 component for self-
generated effects as compared to externally generated effects. Moreover, congruent primes 
enhanced causality judgments and further reduced N1 amplitudes relative to neutral or 
incongruent primes, however, only if the effect was produced by an action and not just 
passively observed. These data show sensory attenuation in early visual processing of action 
outcomes indicating the presence of a feeling of agency for self-caused external visual effects. 
Furthermore, the results support the role of prior thoughts not only in the formation of a 
conscious agency judgment but also in the generation of a feeling of agency, however, 
depending on the presence of motor signals. More generally, these findings imply top-down 
influences of cognitive agency cues on lower-level processes of sensorimotor integration. 
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2.3   Summary of Study 2 
The sense of agency has been shown to depend on accurate anticipation of an action outcome 
based on precise internal motor predictions or based on prior thoughts concerning the action 
effect. It has been proposed that these cues are weighted and integrated according to their 
relative reliability and depending on the level of agency registration. The objective of Study 2 
was to test the hypothesis of optimal cue integration underlying the judgment and feeling of 
agency for these specific agency cues. A modified version of the experimental paradigm used 
in Study 1 was employed. During EEG recording, participants either actively produced or 
passively observed visual effects which were highly contingent (75%) upon their action or not 
(50%), and which were primed prior to action with congruent or incongruent stimuli. Study 
participants were 23 healthy subjects recruited from the general community, and the 
experiment was conducted at Max-Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, 
Leipzig. The main outcome measures included analyses of causality ratings and N1 
component of the ERP to the visual action effects. 
The results showed that participants judged agency to be larger during congruent than 
incongruent priming conditions, however, only if action-effect contingency was low. 
Causality judgments during passive observation were slightly enhanced by congruent primes, 
only if contingency was high. Visual anterior N1 responses to self-produced effects were 
dampened relative to N1 to externally produced effects, and this was most pronounced if 
effects were preceded by congruent primes independent of the degree of action-effect 
contingency. N1 amplitudes to externally produced effects were also reduced by congruent 
priming, again only if contingency was high. N1 was unaffected by contingency. Together, 
the data of Study 2 supports the hypothesis of optimal cue integration underlying the sense of 
agency. Specifically, agency judgments most strongly depend upon precise motor predictions, 
and prior thoughts only have an impact if these predictions are not reliable enough or in the 
absence of any embodied signals. Sensory attenuation, in contrast, is based on the mere 
presence of embodied signals and on prior thoughts, independent of precise motor predictions. 
These findings suggest that processes of cue weighting and integration differ between levels 
of agency registration. 
[The manuscript of Study 2 is to be found from pages 59 to 82.] 
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2.4   Summary of Study 3 
The phenomenology of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suggests a disruption in agency 
experience however very little empirical research has been conducted on this topic. Peculiar 
sensory phenomena such as a lacking sense of action completion and the need to re-enact 
certain actions may be associated with an undermined feeling of agency due to deficient 
processes of sensorimotor integration. The objective of Study 3 was to explore brain 
responsiveness to sensory action effects in OCD patients, in particular by measuring 
sensorimotor attenuation as a marker of the pre-reflective feeling of agency. Moreover, 
higher-level judgments of agency were examined in order to obtain a comprehensive picture 
of agency processing in OCD.  
A modified version of the causality judgment paradigm used in Study 2 was employed during 
EEG recording, consisting of visual color stimuli that were either self- or externally 
generated, highly contingent (75%) or not contingent (50%) upon the action, and primed with 
congruent or incongruent color words. Study participants were 18 patients with OCD 
recruited from the academic outpatient department for OCD at Humboldt-University Berlin, 
and 18 age- and sex-matched control subjects recruited from the general community. The 
experiment was conducted at Humboldt-University Berlin. The main outcome measures 
included analyses of the visual N1 component of the ERP, causality judgments and 
psychometric measures of symptom severity. 
In healthy controls, the posterior N1 component was found to be attenuated to self- relative to 
externally produced effects, and further reduced to highly contingent relative to non-
contingent action outcomes. This pattern was not seen in OCD patients. Furthermore, 
causality judgments were slightly enhanced in OCD patients as compared to healthy controls 
and larger for highly contingent as compared to non-contingent outcomes in both groups. 
Congruent prime stimuli enhanced agency judgments for highly contingent outcomes, 
however, only in controls but not in patients. Together, these data demonstrate deficient 
sensory suppression in OCD suggesting an imprecision of forward model predictions of the 
motor system which prevents the cancellation of sensory action consequences. This may 
explain the patients’ need to re-enact certain actions until a satisfying outcome has been 
obtained signaling task completion. The tendency of OCD patients to consciously perceive 
enhanced agency may reflect a compensatory mechanism for restoring a threatened sense of 
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self at lower levels. In conclusion, the findings of Study 3 emphasize a disturbance of the 
sense of agency in OCD which should be incorporated into contemporary theories. 
[The manuscript of Study 3 is to be found from pages 83 to 106.]  
3 General Discussion
3.1   Attenuation in sensory perception and the sense of agency
The present research focused on the sense of agency that one can have for extracorporeal 
events in the external world, in particular for visual events. In everyday life, for example, one 
may experience agency for a colored line that appears when passing a paint-brush over a 
blank paper. An immediate feeling of agency may emerge in this case without conscious 
reflection about it, and a marker for investigation of this feeling has been sensory attenuation. 
In recent years, cognitive neuroscience has elucidated some of the mechanisms underlying 
this sensory attenuation, focusing however on tactile and auditory modalities (e.g., 
Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Houde, Nagarajan, Sekihara, & Merzenich, 2002). One 
of the values of the present work is that it extends this research to the visual modality by 
showing self-specific attenuation at visual cortical level, which was replicated across three 
studies. Specifically, the N1 component of the visual ERP was found to be reduced in 
amplitude when a stimulus was self-generated and not externally produced. 
Our findings of self-specific N1 attenuation resemble reports of N1 suppression to self-
generated sounds in the auditory modality (e.g., Lange, 2011; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 
2005). Functionally, the visual N1, like the auditory N1, is thought to reflect processes of 
active filtering and has been found to emanate from sensory cortical structures (Martinez et 
al., 1999). Across studies, sensory attenuation at different latencies and topographies was 
observed: in Study 1 and 2 it appeared around 100ms in the early anterior N1 (N1a), and in 
Study 3 around 150ms in the later posterior N1 (N1p). It has been suggested that specifically 
N1p reflects discriminative processes: a larger N1p is observed when stimuli have to be 
discriminated according to certain features such as color or form (Vogel & Luck, 2000). 
These authors also observed a slightly larger N1a during discrimination of form as compared 
to color however the difference did not reach significance. One can only speculate that in the 
present paradigm form discrimination (Study 1 and 2) was reflected in N1a activity, and color 
discrimination (Study 3) in activity of N1p. In general, more research is needed to 
systematically disentangle visual N1 subcomponents and their specificities in information 
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processing within one experimental paradigm in order to be able to interpret functional 
dissociations between components.
The visual N1 has mostly been studied in the context of spatial attention and suggested to 
reflect the selective amplification of information that appears in attended locations (for a 
review, see Mangun, 1995). Importantly, in the present studies all stimuli required active 
discrimination and appeared at attended locations, hence nonspecific effects of spatial 
attention cannot explain the observed attenuation. Instead, it has been proposed that sensory 
attenuation is due to a precise cancellation of action effects, based on specific sensory 
predictions of the motor system, with the amount of attenuation being proportional to the 
congruence of predicted and actual feedback (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000). However, while it is accepted that attenuation depends on 
motor predictions, the precision of these predictions remains debated (Lange, 2011; Tsakiris 
& Haggard, 2003, 2005).  
In Study 1 and 2 precise sensory expectations were induced independently of the motor 
system using priming and were found to modulate N1a amplitudes. In contrast, in Study 2 and 
3, the precision of motor predictions was manipulated by varying the degree of action-effect 
contingency however the two studies yielded discrepant results. That is, only in Study 3 the 
N1p attenuation was observed to be proportional to the error of motor predictions. The 
absence of an effect in Study 2 may have been due to reduced reliability of internal 
predictions in a context of frequent alternation between high and low contingency as 
compared to a context of longer exposure to a certain degree of contingency (Study 3). 
Alternatively, certain features of a stimulus may be more salient if they change, for example 
deviations in color (as in Study 3) have been shown to elicit memory-based components more 
robustly than changes in form or orientation (as in Study 2) (Czigler, Balázs, & Winkler, 
2002; Pazo-Alvarez, Cadaveira, & Amenedo, 2003). In fact, the way in which top-down 
expectations are integrated at different levels of (visual) sensory processing is an emerging 
and unresolved issue in current cognitive neuroscience (see, e.g., Bubic, von Cramon, & 
Schubotz, 2010; Pazo-Alvarez, Cadaveira, & Amenedo, 2003; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). 
Together, our findings suggest that self-specific sensory processing as reflected in attenuated 
brain activity during early visual perception is primarily based on the presence of embodied 
signals and may benefit from precise sensory predictions if they are available and reliable. In 
other words, the immediate feeling of agency for an extracorporeal visual event relies on the 
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observer’s private access to internal states which is available before external feedback from 
the movement arrives. Furthermore, the present research contributes to the understanding of 
the temporal dynamics and neuroanatomy of the sense of agency. The high temporal 
resolution of ERPs reveals the time course of self / non-self distinction: at the cortical level, 
the brain begins to perform automatic, differential processing of sensations caused by oneself 
or externally within 100 to 150 ms after onset of the sensory event. The specific perceptual 
quality of self-generated sensations which results from this early mechanism may give rise to 
the pre-reflective feeling of agency as a first cue to self-causality.
The source of the corollary discharge underling sensory attenuation has been ascribed to 
different cortical and subcortical motor areas, depending on the type of action, such as 
supplementary motor area (e.g., Haggard & Whitford, 2004; Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & 
Wolpert, 2006), cerebellum (e.g., Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001; Blakemore, Wolpert, & 
Frith, 1998) or superior culliculus (e.g., Wurtz, McAlonan, Cavanaugh, & Berman). The 
anticipation associated with this corollary discharge has been shown to affect the 
interpretation of sensory input in primary sensory cortices (somatosensory: e.g., Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; auditory: e.g., Houde, Nagarajan, Sekihara, & Merzenich, 2002; 
visual: e.g., present research) as well as in higher sensory and association cortices (occipital: 
e.g., David et al., 2007; parietal: e.g., Farrer et al., 2003; temporal: e.g., Leube et al., 2003).
By contrast, imaging studies trying to map conscious judgments of self versus external 
causation point towards higher cognitive areas such as the prefrontal cortex being involved in 
processes of belief formation and goal evaluation (for review, see David, Newen, & Vogeley, 
2008; Slachevsky et al., 2001). For example, medial and lateral prefrontal cortices have been 
implicated in monitoring for goal achievement (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Schnell et al., 2007) and self-referential processing (for a critical review, 
see Gillihan & Farah, 2005; e.g., Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001). Thus, it 
seems that different aspects of the sense of agency may be mapped onto distinct neural 
correlates. The agency experience may be built in stages, as has been proposed recently for 
the self: from primordial feelings generated in the brain stem to a core self and 
autobiographical self in the cerebral cortex (Damasio, 2010). Alternatively there may be an 
assembly of different aspects of agency experience that are based on very specific 
information-processing mechanisms. The precise identification and description of the 
interaction among these aspects, for example between higher cognitive control beliefs and 
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low-level sensorimotor processes, remains a central topic and challenge for empirical 
investigation.
3.2   Optimal integration of agency cues
The results of the present three studies provide direct support for the hypothesis that a robust 
experience of agency is established by an optimal combination of different cues, instead of 
relying on a single source of information (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009; Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009). More specifically, the present research shows that embodied 
signals, motor predictions and cognitive cues in the form of prior thoughts are weighted 
against each other, and are recruited depending on their reliability and availability in a certain 
context. Moreover, the present findings reveal that the weighting of agency cues differs 
between the levels of feeling and judgment of agency. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the 
causality judgments obtained in the present three studies. 
Explicit agency judgments were primarily influenced by the degree of action-effect 
contingency, which is in line with findings from recent studies (Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & 
Haggard, 2009; Sato, 2009). Specifically, if precise predictions of the external sensory event 
on the basis of the selected action turned out to be accurate, agency for the sensory event was 
judged to be high. Thus, our results confirm the role of contingency as a critical source of 
information for estimations of causality in general, that is, for the perception of self-causality 
(see Fig. 3.1A; Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a), as well as for 
perceiving causality between external events (see Fig. 3.1B; Michotte, 1963; Shanks & 
Dickinson, 1987). Importantly, the assignment of weight to this cue however varied 
depending on its contextual salience. Action-effect contingency appeared to be more 
informative in contexts of rapidly changing conditions of low and high contingency (Study 2), 
which possibly increased its salience as a potential agency cue, as compared to contexts of 
rather constant conditions of high or low contingency (Study 1 and 3).
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Figure 3.1. (A) Mean agency judgments in the ME task and (B) mean causality judgments in the E 
task as a function of prime effect relation (congruent, dotted line; incongruent, solid line). Conditions 
of high contingency (75%) and low contingency (50%) are plotted on the abscissa separately for 
Study 1 (S1), Study 2 (S2) and Study 3 (S3). Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Asterisks show significant differences between the priming conditions (**P < 0.01; *P < 0.05; (*) P < 
0.10; n.s., not significant)
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As to the influence of prior thoughts, it was observed that subjects’ reliance on this cognitive 
cue for an explicit agency estimate was a function of the reliability of alternative embodied 
cues and the uncertainty in a given context. That is, prior thoughts operated only as agency 
cues within a certain window of agency ambiguity as perceived by the subject and as reflected 
in mean estimates of causality around 50 on the visual analogue scale ranging from 0 to 100. 
In contexts of high agency ambiguity due to unreliable contingency information, primes 
received relatively more weight as compared to contexts in which contingency was perceived 
as being a highly informative cue for an estimate of agency (Fig. 3.1A, left). Moreover, 
primes received less weight in contexts in which embodied cues were completely unreliable 
(Fig. 3.1A, right) or unavailable (Fig. 3.1B) suggesting that prior thoughts as a cognitive 
agency cue are only recruited in the presence of embodied signals. 
At the level of feeling of agency (as measured by sensory attenuation), in contrast, weighting 
and integration of the same agency cues appeared to be different. Study 2 and 3 demonstrate 
that the mere presence of motor signals may have more impact on the feeling of agency than 
specific contingency information. Moreover, findings of Study 1 and 2 reveal that prior 
thoughts can operate as an additional cognitive cue depending on the presence of embodied 
signals, however, independent of contingency information. In fact, with regard to the role of 
contingency as a potential agency cue at this level of agency registration, Study 2 and 3 
yielded discrepant results. This discrepancy mirrors the controversy in the current literature on 
the precision of the motor predictions underlying sensory attenuation (Lange, 2011; Tsakiris 
& Haggard, 2003; see also chapter 3.1). Hence, the feeling of agency seems to be primarily 
informed by embodied signals (i.e., the presence of efference), and may be further influenced 
by cognitive cues and detailed predictions made by forward models, when available.
Together, the present research shows that the sense of agency for an extracorporeal event 
depends on the presence of an action, on contingency knowledge, and on the content of 
thoughts prior to the action. The impact of each of these cues seems to depend on their 
relative reliability, availability or salience in a specific context. While our findings lend 
support to the proposal of cue integration underlying the sense of agency, the operations of 
this integration process need to be tested further, in particular, the reliance on Bayesian rules 
of optimal weighing of sources according to their relative uncertainties (Kording & Wolpert, 
2006). There is strong potential for cognitive psychology and neuroscience to generate further 
insight to this end, especially if combined with paradigms that allow a more direct 
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manipulation of contextual priors or the investigation of the acquisition of agency experience 
for new sensory events.
3.3   A disturbed sense of agency in obsessive-compulsive disorder
A key finding from the present research is the lack of sensory attenuation together with a 
slight increase in conscious perception of agency in patients with OCD as compared to control 
subjects (Study 3). This is the first systematic examination of the neurocognition of agency in 
OCD patients. Our results are consistent with a recent study (Rossi et al., 2005) which 
recorded median-nerve somatosensory evoked potentials and found hypofunctioning sensory 
gating in OCD patients. We extend these results by showing reduced sensory gating in OCD 
patients also for extracorporeal action effects and, furthermore, our findings suggest that the 
impairment is due to a specific deficiency in predicting the sensory consequences of actions.
It is possible to speculate that hyperactive premotor regions in OCD, such as supplementary 
motor area (SMA), may prevent a fine-tuning of corollary discharge and associated 
sensorimotor integration processes which results in an inability to modulate sensory action 
consequences. Indeed, areas involved in motor preparation such as the SMA have been 
ascribed a crucial role in supporting sensory suppression and action-effect binding (Haggard 
& Whitford, 2004; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010; Voss, Ingram, 
Haggard, & Wolpert, 2006; Voss, Ingram, Wolpert, & Haggard, 2008) as well as conscious 
experience of action. For example, Fried et al. (1991) showed that direct electrical stimulation 
of the SMA causes an urge to move in the absence of overt movement. In OCD patients, there 
is evidence that repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation to SMA improves clinical 
symptoms (Mantovani et al., 2006). The impairment in sensory gating of action consequences 
in OCD may become apparent in sensory phenomena such as feelings of incompleteness and 
internal error signals accompanying and motivating compulsive behaviors (Pitman, 1987a; 
Summerfeldt, 2004). 
Our results of the present patient study (Study 3) have several important implications:
First, obsessive-compulsive disorder may be best understood as a disturbance of action 
outcome processing in general. In current models of motor control (e.g., Frith, Blakemore, & 
Wolpert, 2000a; Wolpert, 1997), two different comparator mechanisms depend on the 
precision of internal motor predictions: online monitoring of goal-achievement and online 
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monitoring of sensory predictions. In line with this distinction, Krigolson and Holroyd (2006) 
proposed a hierarchy of error processing: a frontal-medial system that monitors for attainment 
of “high-level” goals, and a posterior-parietal system which is responsible for online, fine-
tuned motor adjustments. A number of studies provide evidence for a dysfunction of the 
frontal-medial system in OCD (e.g., Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000). Our results extend 
these findings in suggesting a dysfunction also in the second comparator, that is, in the 
posterior-parietal error system (Krigolson & Holroyd, 2006). The investigation of 
unconscious adjustments in kinematics to distorted action feedback could provide a useful 
tool to further test the functional integrity of the posterior system in OCD. 
Second, the present data shed light on the relation between low and high levels of agency 
experience. Our findings reveal that OCD can be considered a clinical case for a selective 
impairment of feeling of agency, with a largely preserved level of judgment. This implies that 
agency judgments do not critically depend on bottom-up sensorimotor signals but are 
primarily formed on the basis of prior experiences and beliefs concerning causality. However, 
the loss of reliable sensorimotor cues and the lack of feeling of control may motivate 
conscious compensatory behavior for regaining and increasing subjective causal influence, 
which might be reflected in enhanced explicit agency judgments as observed in the present 
study. Indeed, research suggests that illusions of control and excessive responsibility in OCD 
(e.g., Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999) may reflect a compensation for a 
threatened feeling of control (Moulding & Kyrios, 2006; Reuven-Magril, Dar, & Liberman, 
2008).
Third, our findings imply that the corollary discharge dysfunction found in schizophrenia 
(e.g., Ford & Mathalon, 2004) is not characteristic of a certain disorder. Delusions of control 
and auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia have typically been straightforwardly explained 
by impairment in forward models and corollary discharge (e.g., Frith, 2005; Frith, Blakemore, 
& Wolpert, 2000b; Kircher & Leube, 2003; Lindner, Thier, Kircher, Haarmeier, & Leube, 
2005). However, we demonstrate that a disturbed feeling of agency can have differential 
impact on judgments depending on the cognitive system in which it is integrated. In 
schizophrenic patients, the interpretation of the noisy sensory signals seems to be framed by 
biased beliefs and delusions about causality (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007), whereas in 
OCD patients it seems to be integrated into a system searching for conscious control 
(Moulding & Kyrios, 2006).
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3.4   Caveats and Considerations
One should be aware of some caveats when drawing conclusions from the present work. First, 
the limited ecological validity of laboratory agency paradigms should be kept in mind. We 
applied a commonly used design in which participants perform simple button presses which 
are followed by single sensory events such as a colored square on a computer screen in a 
dimly lit, acoustically shielded chamber. These paradigms bear the advantage of studying the 
construct of interest under experimentally controlled conditions, thus avoiding emotional 
arousal or engagement in other activities as potential confounding factors, and allowing the 
isolation of cognitive mechanisms. However, this is achieved at the cost of artificially 
reducing a complex, dynamic cognitive process and the external world to very few 
dimensions. This limits the explanatory power of the resulting models for daily life behavior 
and complex psychopathologies. Nevertheless, the results obtained from such basic research 
can serve as an evidence base for experiments with progressively greater ecological validity.
A second caveat is a terminological concern. In the present research, the terms causation and 
control were used interchangeably to describe agency experience due to their frequent 
appearance in the agency literature. However, there may be substantive distinctions to be 
drawn between these terms as suggested by conceptual frameworks (e.g., Pacherie, 2008; 
Skinner, 1996). Testable differences between these notions of agency should be addressed by 
future research in order to achieve conceptual clarification and integration of the various 
empirical results concerning the sense of agency. Moreover, the notions of self- and other-
agency were not distinguished, which have been used by some authors in order to refer to 
attributions to the self vs. other agents (e.g., Sato & Yasuda, 2005). The present work, 
however, was exclusively focused on basic mechanisms of self / non-self distinction, and not 
on processes of observation and attribution of agency to other people.
An important methodological consideration concerns the lack of a semantic priming effect in 
the ERP of Study 3 which may have been obscured by our experimental design. Additional 
analyses revealed that neither early N1 nor late N400 or P3 components were affected by 
priming at the semantic level. The choice of prime-effect stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, 
i.e., the time interval between prime and effect stimulus) has been shown to determine the 
probability of detecting an effect. For example, in the domain of language processing, 
semantic priming effects tend to dominate at short prime-effect SOAs (<250 ms; for a review, 
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see Henson, 2003). In Study 3, a SOA of 650 ms was chosen to ensure comparability with 
stimulus timing in Study 1 and 2. Comparison with the priming literature however is limited 
since in these studies typically prime and effect follow each other without interference by 
response activity, as in the present paradigm. Hence, a shortening of the SOA would not have 
been possible in our agency paradigm however a larger SOA could be achieved in future 
experiments by including a delay of the go signal. Importantly, a delay of the action effect 
itself should be avoided since agency experience critically depends on temporal contiguity. 
A final important caveat concerns the comparability and the generalizability the current 
results. Limited research is available for direct comparison with the present findings because 
studies differ in operationalization of self and non-self conditions and in their working 
definition of agency, such that in fact partly distinct mechanisms are investigated. Moreover, 
in the ERP, the functional significance of components may differ across modalities, hence, 
comparison of auditory and visual N1 attenuation should be made with caution. Furthermore, 
due to the heterogeneous patient sample concerning OCD symptoms in Study 3, general 
implications for pathophysiology and treatment can be only tentative before the specificity of 
the present findings with respect to clinical phenomenology has been tested.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the present research sheds new light into the dynamics of 
cognitive and brain mechanisms underlying the sense of agency and its dysregulation in OCD. 
One important objective of the present work was to combine explicit and implicit measures 
and thereby to extend previous studies using only verbal reports. Collectively, our findings 
offer validation of sensory attenuation as an implicit measure of basic, non-conceptual agency 
registration. Furthermore, in line with our second objective, the present studies tested an 
integrative account of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b) and support the 
hypothesis that multiple cues contribute to the sense of agency depending on their relative 
reliability and availability. Moreover, a third objective of the present work was to study a case 
of possible alteration in agency experience. The present research reveals – for the first time, to 
our knowledge - reduced gating of extracorporeal sensory action consequences in patients 
suffering from OCD indicating an aberrant sense of agency in these patients which 
specifically concerns a pre-reflective aspect of agency processing. 
3.5   Future directions
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Clearly, several issues remain to be disclosed by empirical research to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the subjective experience of agency and its disturbances.
Progress will be aided primarily by a deeper exploration of the existing implicit measures of 
agency, such as sensory attenuation, in order to have a clear understanding of the precise 
information processing mechanisms that they are able to capture. This will include 
investigating the nature and origin of sensory predictions underlying sensory attenuation and 
characterizing possible determinants such as type of action and kinematic parameters that are 
involved, modality and proximity of the action feedback or contextual variables. Progress can 
also be made using combinations of implicit measures, such as kinematics and sensory 
attenuation, for exploring the reciprocal relations between action control and perception, 
particularly the role of sensory gating in serving perception as well as action selection. The 
use of similar paradigms will be essential for comparisons across different types of data.
Studies of populations in which agency experience is enhanced should also be very 
informative, as this has been largely neglected so far. Research on disturbances of agency 
typically focus on manifestations of a reduction or complete lack of sense of agency as 
present in dysphoria, schizophrenia, anarchic hand syndrome or anosognostic symptoms. By 
contrast, narcissistic personality disorder in particular, exaggerated beliefs of responsibility in 
OCD or the proneness to magical thinking especially in children are examples of inflated 
agency experiences which may lead to new interesting insights into the formation of feelings 
and judgments of agency.
A further important direction for future research concerns the interdependencies between 
high- and low level features of agency representation. Existing theories and research in the 
area of human causal learning that emphasize the impact of prior knowledge and preexisting 
mental concepts on conscious sensory processing may be very informative (see, e.g., Buehner 
& May, 2004). In general, more research is needed to illuminate the mutual influences 
between high-level cognitive concepts, such as control beliefs or self-efficacy, and low-level 
processes of sensorimotor integration and motor control. This research may also help in 
answering the question of why self-generated, noisy sensory signals cause delusional 
misattributions to external sources in one person but not in others.
3 General Discussion  |   29
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Abstract 
The ability to recognize oneself in voluntary action is called the sense of agency and refers to 
the experience of causing one’s own actions and their sensory consequences. This form of 
self-awareness is important not only for motor control but also for social interactions and the 
ascription of causal responsibility. Here, we examined the sense of agency at early and pre-
reflective stages of action perception using event-related potentials (ERPs) while subjects 
performed a visual forced-choice response task in which action effects were either caused by 
the subject or by the computer. In addition, in order to modulate the conscious experience of 
agency, action effects were subliminally primed by the presentation of congruent, incongruent 
or neutral effect stimuli prior to the action. First, we observed sensorimotor attenuation in the 
visual ERP selectively for self-generated action effects. That is, the N1 component, a negative 
deflection around 100 ms following a visual stimulus, was smaller in amplitude for visual 
effects caused by the subject as compared to effects caused by the computer. Second, 
congruent effect priming enhanced the explicit judgment of agency and further reduced the 
N1 amplitude for self-generated effects, even though effect primes were not consciously 
processed. Taken together, these results provide evidence of a top-down modulation of 
sensory processing of action effects by prior effect information, and support the 
neurophysiological mechanism of sensorimotor attenuation as underlying self-registration in 
action. Our findings suggest that both efferent information and prior thoughts about the action 
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1   Introduction 
How do we come to experience that we are causing our thoughts, actions and even external 
events? The perceptual experience of voluntary actions comprises a sense of self in action, 
that is, a sense of causing and controlling the action and its perceptual consequences. If we 
think about turning on the light and flip the switch, we will automatically and indubitably feel 
that we ourselves caused the light to come on and not somebody or something else. This form 
of self-awareness is called the sense of agency and it mostly remains pre-reflective, that is, in 
most actions we are not explicitly conscious of it (Gallagher, 2000). It can be disturbed in 
psychiatric patients, most typically in the case of schizophrenia, with delusions of control and 
symptoms of thought insertion. These patients interpret their own thoughts or actions as being 
controlled or influenced by someone else (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Despite an 
increasing body of research on the sense of agency (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008), the 
underlying neurocognitive mechanisms are not well understood, in part because studies have 
used different measures and targeted different levels of the sense of agency, meaning that 
findings cannot be related directly to each other. 
A recent conceptual framework (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008) distinguishes at least 
two important representational levels of the sense of agency: the feeling of agency (i.e., a 
sense of coherence in action processing) and the judgment of agency (i.e., a reflexive 
attribution of authorship), with different cues entering each level. The judgment of agency is 
thought to result from a higher-order reflective inference made on the basis of giving weight 
to cognitive indicators such as contextual cues and belief states. In contrast, the feeling of 
agency, being part of the “minimal” or “embodied” self (Gallagher, 2000; Jeannerod, 2007), 
is not based on conscious reflection but is assumed to depend on automatic processing of 
central and peripheral signals generated by the action itself.  
Importantly, most studies so far have used explicit measures requiring reflective authorship 
attribution, and therefore only captured the level of judgment of agency, for example, by 
asking participants to indicate whether they or the computer caused a visual effect (Aarts, 
Custers, & Wegner, 2005). These studies neglected an important aspect of agency, namely the 
non-conceptual immediate feeling of one’s action, which can only be assessed by implicit 
measures. In fact, in our everyday lives, a non-reflective phenomenal experience is more 
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common than an explicit representation of selfhood. Our sense sense of self persists even 
when we are not engaged in explicit reflection. Imagine the situation where you intend to 
cross a road. You will focus your attention on the coming cars but not on yourself even 
though you are conscious of yourself, albeit in a non-reflective manner. An implicit measure 
that has been proposed to capture this background experience of one’s action is the 
attenuation of self-produced sensations (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000), and this was in 
the focus of our experiment.  
Sensory attenuation has been widely investigated by psychophysical studies exploring, for 
instance, the basis of why individuals cannot tickle themselves (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 
1999; Weiskrantz, Elliott, & Darlington, 1971). This mechanism is considered to optimize 
motor control but also to facilitate the ability to differentiate sensations caused by oneself 
from those caused by other agents or external stimuli. Recent neuroscientific research has 
started to specify the underlying neural processes of this. Functional neuroimaging studies, for 
example, report less activation of the primary somatosensory cortex for self-generated as 
compared to externally-generated tactile stimuli (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; 
Helmchen, Mohr, Erdmann, Binkofski, & Buchel, 2006). Furthermore, research using 
electroencephalography (EEG) has shown reduced amplitudes of auditory event-related 
potentials (ERP) following self-produced acoustic sensory input (Curio, Neuloh, Numminen, 
Jousmaki, & Hari, 2000; Houde, Nagarajan, Sekihara, & Merzenich, 2002; Martikainen, 
Kaneko, & Hari, 2005).  
Since attenuation shows up in different sensory systems, it seems to rely on a general 
modality-independent mechanism. It has been suggested that sensory attenuation reflects a 
reduction in the perceptual prediction error depending on forward-model predictions based on 
efference-copy (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Sperry, 1950; von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 
1950). The cerebellum and parietal cortex have been shown to play a central role in the 
processing of prediction error (Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003; Miall, Weir, Wolpert, & Stein, 
1993; Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998). Besides precise spatio-temporal predictions derived 
from motoric signals, however, recent studies revealed that, at higher cognitive levels, 
anticipation based on motor preparation (Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert, 2006; Voss, 
Ingram, Wolpert, & Haggard, 2008) also contributes to this self-specific suppression effect.  
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Until now, existing models of the sense of agency focus exclusively either on its sensorimotor 
underpinnings (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) or, 
in contrast, on higher-level inferences which are unrelated to internal movement-related 
information (Wegner, 2002). Neither model, however, has yet looked at their interrelation. 
For example, the theory of apparent mental causation (Wegner, 2002, 2003) assigns a central 
role to cues that are independent of action execution such as thoughts and beliefs prior to the 
action or contextual information. It is assumed that these cues are used by a mental inference 
mechanism for generating a sense of agency. This view suggests that people think they have 
caused a light to turn on - even if they actually did not act at all - if they were thinking about it 
just before it happened and if there seem to be no alternative possible cause. Evidence 
supporting this theory has been provided by studies which used priming to manipulate 
thoughts about an action effect before the action was actually performed (Aarts, Custers, & 
Wegner, 2005; Linser & Goschke, 2007; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009; Sato, 2009; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). The typical finding is that consistency between a prime and a 
subsequent action effect enhances the reported experience of agency even if the effect has in 
fact not been caused by the subject’s action and is therefore independent of the motor system 
execution commands.  
In contrast, the motor-prediction model of agency, derived from theories on motor control 
(Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995), claims that the sense of agency depends on 
predictions of an internal forward model which are compared to input from sensory systems 
(Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). In particular, the forward model receives a copy of the 
motor command (von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950) that is transformed into the expected 
sensory consequences resulting from the particular action. It is further assumed that a 
comparator mechanism then matches the predicted and actual sensory outcome: Congruency 
induces a sense of agency whereas incongruence leads to the experience of external causation 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). That is, according to this view, the experience of 
having caused a light to turn on depends on the action of flipping the switch and the 
predictions based on the learning history of this action-effect coupling. Evidence for the 
comparator model has been provided by a number of behavioral and neurophysiological 
studies as well as patient studies (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Feinberg & Guazzelli, 
1999; Ford & Mathalon, 2004; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003; 
Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert, 2006).  
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However, despite the evidence that different cues (e.g., motor-prediction and prior thoughts) 
can contribute to the sense of agency, their specific contribution to the different levels of 
agency and their integration has not been studied yet. The present study sought to address this 
issue by focusing on sensory attenuation as a possible neural proxy (i.e., as a non-verbal 
measure of the feeling of agency) and to compare it to an explicit, verbal measure capturing 
the judgment of agency.  
The specific aim of the present study was twofold. First, our purpose was to verify whether 
sensory attenuation can also be identified in the visual and not only in the auditory ERP, and 
can be considered a possible implicit neural indicator of the sense of agency (cf. Gallagher, 
2000). Second, and more importantly, we aimed to find out whether prior thoughts about the 
consequence of an action can not only influence the reflective experience of control (i.e., the 
judgment of agency) but can also modulate early sensory processing, in terms of enhancement 
or attenuation (i.e., the feeling of agency). For example, if one accidentally flips a light switch 
by leaning against a wall, the sudden illumination would probably be unexpected and one 
might not immediately consider oneself as being the cause. In contrast, if an individual 
anticipates the appearance of the light, for example due to somebody else warning him or her, 
the sudden light would certainly be less unexpected and attention-getting and accompanied by 
an immediate feeling of causation. This modulation of attention might be mediated by the 
process of sensory attenuation for example. 
To investigate these issues, we recorded the EEG activity while participants viewed either 
self- or externally-generated visual effects. Critically, we used masked priming in order to 
establish a subliminal thought about the action effect prior to the action. It has been shown 
that the illusion of conscious control over an action effect even occurs under conditions in 
which the prime is presented below the level of conscious awareness (Aarts, Custers, & 
Wegner, 2005; Linser & Goschke, 2007). In particular, we were interested in how prior 
thoughts can affect sensory attenuation of self-generated visual effects in early ERP 
components such as N1. Furthermore, participants gave estimates of the causal relation 
between their action and the effect as a measure of the judgment of agency. Based on theories 
of motor-control, we expected a reduced magnitude in the N1 component as a reflection of 
sensory attenuation, specifically linked to self-generated effects. According to the inferential 
account, priming should affect the conscious judgment of agency (i.e., enhance causality 
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estimates in cases in which prime and effect are congruent). Moreover, since the effect 
anticipation can be matched to the actual sensory input and thereby reduce the sensory 
prediction error, we predicted that a congruency between prime and subsequent effect should 
lead to further attenuation of the early visual ERP. In other words, we predicted that a 
cognitive agency indicator such as prior thoughts about a subsequent effect is integrated not 
only at the level of conscious judgments but already at the level of primary perceptual 
processing (i.e., the level of feeling of agency). Furthermore, according to the inferential 
account, the influence of prior thoughts is independent of efferent motor information, and 
therefore, the impact of priming should be present even if effects are not actively produced by 
a person. 
2   Methods 
2.1 Subjects 
Twenty-four right-handed subjects (12 women; mean age 24 years, range 19-31 years), with 
normal or corrected to normal vision participated in the experiment after providing written 
informed consent. The study was performed in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2 Task and procedure 
In line with previous ERP research on sensory attenuation (Bäss, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008; 
Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005), the experiment consisted of three different tasks (see 
Fig. 4.1). In the motor-effect task (ME), subjects self-generated visual action effects, whereas 
in the effect-only task (E), the same visual effects were externally generated. Differences in 
the effect-related ERP between the ME and E task would indicate self-specific processing of 
visual action consequences. A motor-only task (M) served as a control task to rule out motor 
activity as a possible confounding factor in the comparison between the ME and E task. 
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Figure 4.1.  Sequence of stimulus events in the ME, E and M tasks. Trials with an 
incongruent prime-effect relation are shown for the ME and E tasks.  
 
The ME task was a modified version of the agency paradigm described by Linser and 
Goschke (2007) in which subjects gave forced-choice left and right key press responses which 
triggered the appearance of one of two alleged effect stimuli. Participants were asked to pay 
attention to the relation between the choice of the response key and the type of effect 
stimulus. Stimuli were displayed in black on a gray background using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). Each trial began with a 150 ms presentation of a forward 
mask, which was followed by a prime (40 ms) and a backward mask (20 ms).  
The prime stimuli consisted of a set of three arrows pointing either upwards or downwards 
(subtending a visual angle of 0.3° x 1.6°). The mask was composed of up and downward 
pointing arrows superimposed on each other, subtending an angle of 0.7° x 2.3°. Following 
the backward mask, one of two target stimuli (a circle or square) was randomly selected, 
presented for 50 ms (with a visual angle of 0.5° in width and height) and replaced by a blank 
screen which remained until participants pressed the left or right key. The target-response 
mapping was counterbalanced across participants. After a 20 ms delay, responses were 
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followed by either up or downward pointing arrows (of the size of the prime stimuli), which 
were presented for 750 ms and followed by an inter-stimulus-interval of 1500 ms. In order to 
create a context of agency ambiguity, the contingency between action and effect was lowered 
to 75%, a degree at which the influence of effect priming has been demonstrated in previous 
studies (Linser & Goschke, 2007; Sato, 2009). That is, the mapping of the target stimulus, 
which determined the action choice, and the effect stimulus was not consistent across all 
trials: In 75 % of the trials, one particular target stimulus was related to one particular effect 
stimulus, whereas in the remaining 25 % of trials, the opposite mapping appeared. This target-
effect mapping was counterbalanced across participants.  
After each block of 48 trials, the experience of control was assessed using a 10 cm visual 
analog scale (VAS). Subjects had to judge the degree to which they thought that their key 
press (left or right) determined the pointing direction of the arrows on a scale ranging from 
0% (no control) to 100% (full control). The critical factor was the relationship between prime 
and effect stimuli, which was either congruent (arrows pointed in the same direction), 
incongruent (arrows pointed in the opposite direction) or neutral (primes consisted of 
superimposed up and downward arrows). The prime-effect relation was varied blockwise and 
participants performed 3 blocks of 48 trials for each prime-effect condition. 
The E task was an observation task in which stimuli were externally generated by the 
computer with identical timing as in the ME task. That is, subjects just passively viewed the 
same visual scenario. In place of the response window and the button press, a blank screen 
appeared for a duration of 470 ms, which was selected to mirror the mean reaction time in the 
ME task. The subsequent effect stimuli were presented with the same target-effect mapping 
(75/25) as in the ME task. Participants were again asked to pay attention to the causal relation 
between the target stimulus and the subsequent effect stimulus and had to judge the degree to 
which the target determined the pointing direction of the arrows on a VAS ranging from 0 to 
100 as in the ME task. The prime-effect relation was varied blockwise, as in the ME task, and 
participants performed 3 blocks of 48 trials for each condition. 
In the motor-only task (M), subjects had to respond to the target stimuli in the same manner as 
in the ME task, but no visual effect stimuli were presented. That is, responses were followed 
by a blank screen for 2250 ms until the next trial started. The order of the tasks was fixed 
across all participants: Six alternating blocks of ME and E tasks were followed by one block 
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of the M task consisting of 48 trials and a two minute break (ME-E-ME-E-ME-E-M-break). 
This sequence of tasks was repeated three times. 
2.3 Prime awareness and prime processing 
After the main experiment, participants performed two additional control tasks which aimed 
to test whether prime stimuli were perceived even though subjects were unaware of them. 
First, subjects performed a response priming task which was used to measure prime 
perception. Subjects pressed the left or right key as quickly and as accurately as possible in 
response to one of two target stimuli. Stimulus material was the same as in the ME task 
except that the former effect stimuli served as targets (up or downward pointing arrows), and 
responses were no longer followed by an effect. The interstimulus interval was 1500 ms. The 
relation between prime and target stimulus was either congruent, incongruent or neutral. 
Differences in reaction times between any of these conditions would indicate that prime 
stimuli were perceived. The target-response mapping was counterbalanced across participants. 
Twelve practice trials were followed by a random sequence of 180 trials with 60 trials per 
condition.  
Furthermore, at the end of the experiment, prime awareness was assessed using self-report (in 
a structured interview) as a subjective measure and a prime-discrimination task as an 
objective measure. The latter task consisted of the same stimulus material as the ME task 
except that targets were now replaced by a question mark (50 ms duration, 0.5° x 0.5°). 
Subjects were instructed to attend to the masked prime stimuli and to try to discriminate 
between them by pressing the left button for upward pointing arrows and the right button for 
downward pointing arrows, and to guess if they did not recognize the pointing direction. The 
prime-response mapping was the same as in the target-discrimination task. Primes appeared in 
random order and 160 trials were presented.  
2.4 EEG recording and analysis 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 scalp Ag-AgCl electrodes embedded 
in a fabric cap according to the international 10-20 system (BioSemi Active II system, 
BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). The electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from 
electrodes placed external to the outer canthus of each eye and below and above the right eye. 
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All channels were referenced to the left mastoid and signals were amplified and digitized at 
512 Hz. 
Analysis of EEG data was performed using Brain Vision software (Brain Products GmbH, 
Gilching, Germany). EEG recordings were low-pass filtered at 30 Hz, high-pass filter at 0.75 
Hz and re-referenced to average reference. Non-stereotyped muscular artifacts such as 
swallowing or temporary electrode artifacts were identified by visual inspection and rejected 
from further analysis. Repeatedly occurring, stereotyped artifacts such as eye movements or 
heartbeat were identified and removed using independent component analysis (ICA) (Jung et 
al., 2000). This procedure led to a rejection of 1.4% of epochs on average (mean: 13.97, 
range: 2-38). Two participants were excluded from the ERP analysis because of excessive 
movement-related artifacts. Subsequently, stimulus-locked data epochs were computed (-200 
to 400 ms) and baseline-corrected using a 100 ms window before the response. Separate ERP 
average waveforms were then computed for each of the three tasks (ME, E, and M task) and 
for each of the three prime-effect conditions (congruent, incongruent, and neutral, separately 
for the ME and E task). Finally, grand mean ERPs were calculated by averaging each 
condition across participants. Only trials with correct responses (mean percentage: 99 %) 
were included in grand mean average ERPs and statistical analyses. 
Sensory attenuation effects in the auditory modality have been found to be most prominent 
around 100 ms following the effect stimulus over fronto-central brain regions (Bäss, 
Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005). The visual N1 has distinct 
subcomponents (Vogel & Luck, 2000), an early anterior subcomponent peaking around 100 
ms after stimulus onset over fronto-central sites and a late posterior subcomponent peaking 
around 160 ms after stimulus onset over inferoposterior sites. In our analysis, we focused on 
the anterior N1 component and quantified its mean amplitude in the average ERP waveform 
of each experimental condition for each participant at nine electrode sites in the fronto-centro-
parietal region (FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, C4, CP3, CPz, CP4). Mean voltages were calculated 
in the 80 to 130 ms time interval following the onset of the effect stimuli. The measurement 
window comprises the latency of the anterior visual N1 component usually reported in the 
literature (Vogel & Luck, 2000). The impact of a possible oddball effect in the N1 time range 
was examined and excluded. Since no difference in N1 amplitude was observed for standard 
and deviant effect stimuli, both standards and deviants were included in the average ERP to 
increase the signal-to-noise ratio. 
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2.5 Statistical analysis 
Mean ERP voltages were submitted to a four-way repeated-measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the factors task (2 levels: ME, E), prime-effect condition (3 levels: congruent, 
incongruent, neutral), anterior-posterior electrode location (3 levels: FC, C, CP) and lateral 
scalp location (3 levels: 3=left; z=midline; 4=right). If data violated the sphericity assumption, 
we applied the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. We used Tukey’s HSD test as a multiple 
comparison post-hoc procedure for further examination of differences and interactions 
between task, priming condition and electrode location. All measured amplitude values were 
tested for normal distribution with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
3   Results 
3.1 Behavioral results  
In the prime discrimination task, subjects' ability to discriminate prime stimuli was at chance 
level (one-sample t-test with the chance level of performance set at 50%, t(19) = 1.14, p = 
0.27), which indicates that subjects were not aware of the prime stimuli. Two participants who 
reported conscious prime detection were excluded and further analyses were conducted with 
data from the remaining 20 subjects. 
In the response priming task, we observed significant differences in reaction times, F(2,38) = 
53.01, p < .001, and error rates, F(2,38) = 9,04, p < .001, depending on prime-effect 
congruency. This indicates that, despite being unaware of the stimuli, participants’ perception 
was influenced by the prime stimuli. Reaction times were faster in congruent trials (M=403 
ms, SEM=49.72) as compared to incongruent trials (M=452 ms, SEM=44.39), p < .001, or 
neutral trials (M=420 ms, SEM=49.31), p < .01, and the error rate was lower for congruent 
trials (M=4.4%, SEM=3.19) as compared to incongruent trials (M=10.6%, SEM=7.02), p < 
.001. Figure 4.2 displays mean explicit agency judgments for different prime-effect conditions 








Figure 4.2.  Mean control judgments in the ME task and the E task as a function of prime-effect 
congruency. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The ANOVA with mean rating scores given in the ME task as the dependent variable yielded 
a significant main effect of prime-effect congruency, F(2,38) = 4.32, p < .05. A Tukey HSD 
post-hoc test revealed that participants reported a significantly stronger experience of control 
over the effect stimuli after blocks with congruent (M=53.5, SEM=2.48) as compared to 
incongruent prime-effect pairs (M=43.2, SEM=3.26), p < .05. No significant difference in 
control judgments was found between congruent and neutral trials (M=48.9, SEM=3.49, p > 
.15), or incongruent and neutral trials (p > .15). The prime-effect conditions were not 
associated with differences in mean reaction times (p > .15) or error rates (p > .15); hence, 
response differences cannot account for the effect on perceived control. 
In the E task, participants also provided causality judgments concerning the relation between 
target stimuli and effect stimuli. This judgment task was included in order to ensure 
comparable levels of involvement and attention between both the ME and E tasks. In contrast 
to results obtained in the ME task, the ANOVA for the E task showed no significant 
difference in causality judgments between conditions of congruent (M=46.3, SEM=3.31), 
incongruent (M=44.8, SEM=3.67) and neutral priming (M=49.6, SEM=2.80, p > .15).  
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3.2 ERP results  
Anterior N1 Scalp Distribution 
Figure 4.3A displays the grand-average ERP waveforms recorded at fronto-central, central 
and centro-parietal electrodes obtained during the E and ME task, separately for the three 
experimental prime-effect conditions. In Figure 4.3B, the scalp map of the difference wave 
between the E task and ME task is shown. An anterior N1 component is evident in the ERP 
waveform as a negative deflection peaking around 100 ms after stimulus onset, with a mid-
central scalp distribution.  
The ANOVA across both tasks revealed a main effect of anterior-posterior electrode location, 
F(2,38) = 15.52, p < .001, which indicated that N1 was larger over fronto-central and central 
compared to centro-parietal brain regions. A significant interaction between laterality and 
anterior-posterior electrode location was present, F(2,38) = 4.74, p < .01. This interaction 
effect showed that at central and centro-parietal sites, the N1 amplitude was larger at midline 
than at lateral electrodes, all ps < .05, whereas at frontal sites, no difference between midline 
and lateral electrodes was present. Comparisons between left versus right hemisphere 
electrode positions did not reveal significant differences in N1 amplitudes. No differences in 
scalp distribution of the ERP were observed between the ME and E task. 
Anterior N1 and Sensory Attenuation 
From Figure 4.3A, it is clear that the N1 wave is larger for effect stimuli elicited in the E task 
than in the ME task. However, prior to computing and comparing N1 amplitudes, we first had 
to correct for component overlap in the ME task. In our task design, stimulus and response 
occurred simultaneously in the ME task, such that brain responses elicited by stimulus 
processing and motor activity were likely to overlap and distort the computed stimulus-locked 
ERP waveforms. The corrected ERPs in the ME task were obtained by subtraction of activity 
elicited by the M task in which only motor responses and no effect stimuli occurred. Figure 
4.3C demonstrates that motor-related activity did not modulate the N1 amplitude. By using 
the corrected ERPs in all subsequent analyses, the influence of motor activity as a 








Figure 4.3.  (A), Stimulus-locked grand-average ERP waveforms for the E and ME tasks at electrodes 
FCz, Cz and CPz and, (B), scalp topographies of the voltage difference between E and ME tasks, 
separately for the three priming conditions. (C), Grand-average ERPs for the E task (red), ME task 
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Anterior N1 and Effect Priming 
Results of an ANOVA across tasks and electrode sites showed a main effect of prime-effect 
congruency, F(2,38) = 5.02, p < .05, indicating smaller amplitudes for congruent prime-effect 
conditions as compared to incongruent and neutral priming. Priming and laterality interacted 
significantly, F(4,76) = 4.03, p < .01, due to a larger effect of priming at midline compared to 
lateral electrodes. The interaction between prime-effect congruency and task did not reach 
significance, F(2,38) = 2.34, p = .10. 
In order to further investigate the differential effects of priming on N1 amplitudes, we 
computed separate ANOVAs for the ME task and the E task, including the factors prime-
effect condition, anterior-posterior electrode location and laterality. Figure 4.4 shows grand-
average ERP waveforms for the ME task and the E task at electrode Cz as a function of 
priming.  
In the ME task, there was a significant main effect of prime-effect congruency on N1 
amplitude, F(2,38) = 6.87, p < .01, indicating smaller amplitudes for congruent effect priming 
as compared to incongruent and neutral effect priming. Focusing on electrode site Cz, we 
conducted Tukey’s HSD post-hoc comparisons of amplitudes between priming conditions. 
These analyses demonstrated that N1 amplitudes were significantly smaller for the congruent 
priming condition as compared to incongruent or neutral effect priming, all ps < .05, without 
any significant difference between the latter two conditions (p > .15). Moreover, we observed 
a significant interaction between priming and laterality, F(4,76) = 2.86, p < .05, indicating 
that the effect of priming was largest at midline electrodes compared to lateral sites. 
For the E task, the ANOVA yielded no significant effect of prime-effect congruency on N1 








Figure 4.4.  Stimulus-locked grand average ERP waveforms at FCz, Cz and CPz for the ME and E 
tasks as a function of prime-effect relation. 
 
Thus far, our results demonstrate attenuation of ERP responses specifically to self-generated 
visual effects in the ME task. Further analyses showed that priming modulated the ERP 
response in the ME but not in the E task, and most strongly at central electrode locations. In 
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order to test whether priming had an impact on the self-specific attenuation effect, we 
computed an ANOVA with amplitudes of the difference waves between the ME and E task. 
The main effect of priming did not, however, reach significance (p = .10) possibly due to low 
statistical power. Furthermore, no interaction effects between prime-effect condition and 
anterior-posterior electrode position or laterality were observed (ps > .15).  
4   Discussion 
4.1 Self-specific attenuation of visual effects: a sensorimotor mechanism 
underlying the sense of agency 
The present study aimed to measure sensory attenuation in the visual event-related potential 
as a sensorimotor and pre-reflective marker capturing the feeling of agency. The experiment 
focused on the N1 wave of the visual ERP. We found the N1 component to be smaller in 
response to visual effects that were caused by the subjects’ actions as compared to the same 
effects that were externally caused and passively observed by the subjects. Thus, our results 
indicate specific sensory attenuation in processing of self-generated visual events. In humans, 
sensory attenuation has mainly been shown in the auditory but also in the tactile modality, 
both at the subjective perceptual level (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Sato, 2009), and 
also at the neurophysiological level (Bäss, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008; Curio, Neuloh, 
Numminen, Jousmaki, & Hari, 2000; Houde, Nagarajan, Sekihara, & Merzenich, 2002; 
Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005). This is the first ERP study characterizing the time 
course of sensory attenuation in the visual modality using the advantage of the high temporal 
resolution of EEG.  
It is important to note that the N1 component cannot be compared directly across modalities, 
since amplitude, latency and topography differ as a function of the stimulus modality that is 
addressed during a given experimental protocol. In the auditory domain, for example, stimuli 
usually elicit larger N1 amplitudes with shorter latency than in the visual domain, in which 
the N1 component can be further subdivided into at least two distinct subcomponents (Vogel 
& Luck, 2000). Hence, task-dependent (self, other) modulation of the visual N1 amplitude is 
likely to be smaller than in studies using auditory stimuli. Indeed, in our experiment, the 
effect on the visual N1 amplitude was less pronounced than the suppression effects reported 
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in the literature measuring the auditory N1 (Bäss, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008; Ford & 
Mathalon, 2004; Heinks-Maldonado, Mathalon, Gray, & Ford, 2005). Future studies are 
needed which directly compare attenuation effects across modalities. 
According to theories of motor control, the availability of efferent information in the case of 
self-generated effects allows a forward model to make precise predictions about the upcoming 
action effect (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995): A match between the predicted and 
actual effect leads to a cancellation of the afferent information (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 
1999). In contrast, no efferent information is available when the effect is externally generated. 
Hence, predictability of the effect is less precise and cannot be used for cancellation. These 
predictive processes enable the brain to already differentiate between external effects that the 
organism causes and those it does not cause at an early stage in sensory processing. Our study 
suggests that sensory attenuation is not only a mechanism to optimize motor control but that it 
also contributes to action perception, specifically to the attribution of action and thus the 
experience of agency. 
It has been shown that the magnitude of the visual N1 component increases when attention is 
directed to the location of a stimulus, which suggests that spatial attention leads to selective 
amplification of sensory information flow in visual pathways (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998; 
Mangun, 1995). In our study, we compared brain responses to identical visual events that 
were either passively observed or actively produced. It may be argued that differences in 
attentional processes between experimental conditions in terms of a higher level of general 
attention in the active response task (ME task) caused the modulation of N1 amplitudes. 
However, if this were the case, one would expect a N1 attenuation effect in the opposite 
direction, that is, an increased N1 component in the response task as compared to the 
observation condition (E task). In order to keep the degree of task and attentional involvement 
at a similar level, the subjects were required to perform causality judgments in both tasks. 
Thus, they directed their attention to the effect stimuli in either case by judging the causal 
relation between the effect stimulus and the preceding target or response, respectively. Since 
responses were always determined by the target stimulus, similar cognitive operations were 
involved in both judgment tasks. Furthermore, in a post-experiment questionnaire, subjects 
indicated that they did not perceive a difference in task difficulty between both conditions.  
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Nevertheless, even though task involvement was comparable, it could be suggested that the 
mere presence of an action influenced the amount of attention available for the subsequent 
visual event, thereby leading to a N1 reduction, independent of any predictive mechanism. 
We do not believe, however, that our finding of self-specific N1 attenuation is simply due to a 
non-specific reduction in attention because our second experimental manipulation concerning 
priming demonstrates that attenuation can arise from top-down expectations not associated 
with motor preparation and execution as indicated by the significant main effect of prime-
effect congruency. Taken together, this early perceptual discrimination of the self from the 
non-self as reflected in N1 attenuation to self-generated effects obviously informs a basic 
action representation, which provides the basis for the attribution of events to our own actions 
(i.e., the experience of agency). 
4.2 Prior effect representations contribute to the judgment of agency  
The judgment of agency has been assumed to depend on effect anticipations and their 
respective consistency with the actual effect (cf. Wegner, 2002). In support of this, we found 
that agency judgments were enhanced when a prime stimulus prior to the action and the action 
effect were congruent as compared to when they were incongruent or unrelated, which is 
consistent with previous studies (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Linser & Goschke, 2007; 
Sato, 2009). We further showed that this modulation of the sense of agency occurred even 
though prior effect information remained at an unconscious level and the action of the subject 
was predetermined. These findings suggest that processes underlying the experience of 
agency do not necessarily become conscious. Environmental cues can be used to establish a 
sense of agency without entering our conscious awareness. 
It seems counterintuitive that subjects experienced a sense of agency in a situation in which 
they could not freely chose the action. Importantly, we here investigated the agency 
experience for external events (and not for actions per se), which should not depend on the 
degree of freedom of actions and choice. For example, if a sound occurs after one is forced to 
press the light switch, the fact that the action was not chosen by oneself has no informative 
value concerning the causal relation between the button press and the sound. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the formation of action-effect associations (i.e., ideomotor 
learning) can occur only in the case of voluntary actions (Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007), 
 
 
4 Manuscript of Study 1  |   51 
 
with diverging findings however (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). In line with the ideomotor 
principle, in the response priming task, which served as our control task, we showed that the 
former action effects which served as target stimuli influenced both speed and accuracy of 
action selection despite the fact that actions were previously exogenously driven. Moreover, 
as Wegner and colleagues demonstrated, priming of action effects induces a sense of agency 
even in the absence of an action or in situations in which the event is completely 
uncontrollable (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). That is, 
action effect primes can mimic voluntary actions in that they activate a representation of the 
action consequence prior to the action which can then be used to infer agency. 
Our results further show that priming did not influence the perception of causality between 
two external sensory events which were unrelated to any action in a passive observation task. 
Interestingly, the sensory input and the actual causal relation did not differ between the active 
response (ME) task and the observation (E) task: In both tasks, the effect stimuli were 
determined to the same degree (75%) by the preceding target stimuli. The two tasks differed 
only in terms of whether the appearance of the effect stimulus depended on an action at all or 
was externally controlled by the computer. Indeed, some subjects even directly focused on the 
relationship between effect and preceding target in the response task, as they were aware of 
the fact that responses could not be chosen freely but were determined by the target. Despite 
these similarities between both tasks, our findings indicate that unconscious representations of 
upcoming external effects only then influence causality judgments when the effects are 
produced by an action. That is, although it has been argued that an individual’s prior thoughts 
can also induce feelings of agency for effects generated by others even when the individual 
was not active (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004), this does not seem to be transferable 
to the perception of causality for events in which no actor is involved at all.  
The perception of causality in general relies upon observation of spatio-temporal correlations 
between at least two events in order to ascribe cause and effect. Agency, as a special case of 
causality, implies there is an actor, namely the perceiving subject him or herself, as the cause 
of an external event. In order to ascribe cause and effect in the case of agency, the subject’s 
action itself is the focus of evaluation and has to be related to the observed effect in terms of 
spatio-temporal correlations. Prior representations of upcoming action effects are essential for 
action selection, on the one hand, but also for action monitoring, on the other, by enabling a 
comparison between the goal of the action and the actual action effect. It is thought that 
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priming influences these prior representations of action consequences (Aarts, Custers, & 
Wegner, 2005), and thereby modulates the outcome of the action-effect evaluation. In 
contrast, the content of prior effect representations has not been assigned a central role in the 
context of perceived causality between external events. 
4.3 Prior effect representations modulate the feeling of agency 
Prior effect representations are anticipatory or intentional states which serve as cognitive cues 
to the judgment of agency. However, their impact on the sensorimotor level of feeling of 
agency is still unknown. We expected that, analogous to the impact of efference-based 
predictions, prime-induced effect anticipations would also influence the N1 amplitude. 
Indeed, our results showed that the N1 amplitude following self-generated action effects was 
modulated by the congruency between prime and effect. We observed reduced N1 amplitudes 
when the relation between prime and effect was congruent as compared to an incongruent or 
neutral prime stimulus. These findings are generally in line with a previous neuroimaging 
study investigating the effect of unconscious semantic priming on brain responses to 
subsequent visible target words (Dehaene et al., 2001). This study reported reduced brain 
activation to target stimuli in extrastriate, fusiform and precentral regions depending on the 
congruency between unconscious prime stimuli and target stimuli.  
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that this stimulus-specific repetition suppression 
phenomenon is the consequence of top-down expectations rather than automatic bottom-up 
perceptual repetition effects (Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008). 
Thus, our results indicate that effect anticipation as an important cognitive agency indicator at 
the level of explicit agency judgments also serves as a cue for the sensorimotor representation 
of agency (i.e., the feeling of agency). It is important to note, however, that there was no 
significant impact of priming on the N1 amplitude difference between self and externally 
generated action effects even though priming exclusively affected the N1 amplitude following 
self-generated effects but not the N1 following externally generated effects. The lack of a 
statistically significant influence is probably due to low statistical power, which increases the 
possibility of a type II error.  Alternatively, prior information (induced by priming) might 
possibly also have a general effect on the processing of sensory events regardless of the 
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source of the event. However, this might have been too weak to manifest itself statistically in 
the context of the present experimental paradigm.  
Further studies are needed which extend the present paradigm to other sensory modalities. 
Studies that investigated sensory attenuation in the auditory modality, for example, have 
reported larger and obviously more robust effects (Bäss, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008; Ford & 
Mathalon, 2004; Heinks-Maldonado, Mathalon, Gray, & Ford, 2005; Martikainen, Kaneko, & 
Hari, 2005). On the other hand, effect anticipation induced by priming is only one of many 
different agency cues that are combined to form a robust agency representation. Hence, 
despite the obvious impact on measures of agency, its influence is limited and complemented 
by other factors such as proprioceptive and motor signals as well as contextual cues and self-
concept. According to recent views (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009; Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008), the sense of agency depends on an optimal integration and 
combination of a wide variety of internal and external cues at different representational levels.  
Our study supports this perspective and demonstrates a new approach to the sense of agency 
by targeting different levels of agency processing within one experimental paradigm using 
implicit and explicit measures at the same time. However, the interaction of the mechanisms 
underlying these implicit and explicit measures (i.e., the relation between pre-reflective and 
reflective aspects of the sense of agency) still needs to be explored. Based on observed 
dissociations between action awareness and automatic action control, it has, for instance, even 
been argued that the conscious experience of action cannot depend on endogenous signals 
used for motor control since they are poorly accessible to consciousness (Fourneret & 
Jeannerod, 1998; Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998). However, in the present study, we 
demonstrated that subliminal information about an action outcome can have an impact not 
only on the conscious experience of action but also on automatic, unconscious processes of 
motor control and sensory gating. In order to do justice to the complex phenomenology of 
agency, future studies are needed to further explore the relative weighting by which different 
conscious and unconscious cognitive, sensory and motor-related signals are integrated at 
different perceptual stages.  
In conclusion, we here show that both subliminal effect anticipation induced by priming and 
efference-based prediction seem to have similar effects at early stages of sensory processing 
of an action consequence. Whereas the comparator and inference models emphasize distinct 
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agency indicators, with these being motor-related information and prior thoughts, 
respectively, both seem to influence the sense of agency not only at the level of conscious 
judgments but also at the level of non-conceptual feeling. That is, the comparator mechanism 
which matches expected and actual action consequences can be fed by different agency cues 
derived from internal or external sources, and the outcome of this comparison is already 
reflected at the level of immediate perceptual processing. The resulting attenuation of brain 
responses to sensory input in the case of agreement between expectation and actual state is 
accompanied by a feeling of action completion and control, and thereby contributes to the 
conscious experience of being the agent. 
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Abstract 
This study examines the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the sense of agency, that is, 
the experience of causing and controlling events in our environment. Specifically, we tested 
the hypothesis that the sense of agency depends on an optimal integration of different 
anticipatory signals, generated by motor and nonmotor systems. An established marker of pre-
reflective agency experience is the suppression of neural responses to actively generated 
feedback as compared to passively observed feedback, which was measured here by event-
related potentials (ERPs). Sensory expectations based on motor-related and unrelated signals 
were induced by varying the probabilistic contingency between action and feedback, and by 
priming the feedback prior to the action. Moreover, simultaneous conscious agency judgments 
were assessed. Suppression of the N1 component of the ERP was found specifically to self-
generated feedback, and was further affected by accurate anticipations based on prime stimuli, 
independent of the precision of motor predictions. Conscious agency judgments, in contrast, 
were enhanced by prime stimuli only in situations where no precise motor predictions of the 
action feedback were available. These results indicate that anticipatory signals arising from 
motor and nonmotor systems are integrated differently depending on the level of agency 
processing. Our findings suggest that, at a pre-reflective level, the brain’s agency system 
relies on both embodied signals and nonmotor sensory expectations. At higher cognitive 
levels, motor and nonmotor cues are weighted differently depending on their relative 
reliability in a given context, thereby providing a basis for robust agentive self-awareness. 
Keywords 
Sense of agency, Sensory suppression, Motor prediction, Forward model, ERP, N1 
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1    Introduction 
The experience of being the cause of one’s actions and controlling sensory events in the 
environment serves as a key motivational force for human behavior. The term agency refers to 
the capacity for instrumental action, which is based upon the ability to perceive dependencies 
between actions and their consequences. An important source of signals contributing to this 
form of self awareness is foreknowledge or predictive processing of the sensory consequence 
that follows an action (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007; Michotte, 1963; Wegner, Sparrow, & 
Winerman, 2004). Pathological disruption of the sense of agency has been associated with 
deficits in internal prediction mechanisms, for example, in the case of schizophrenic patients 
with delusions of control, i.e., misattribution of actions to external causes (Frith, 2005). 
Internal sensory predictions, that is, internal models of future bodily states or environmental 
events following an action, can be generated by the motor system (Wolpert & Miall, 1996). In 
addition, sensory predictions can also arise from various other systems which take the current 
context, previous perceptual experiences and other predictive cues into account (for review, 
see Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Summerfield et al., 2006). Research on the 
neurocognitive basis of the sense of agency has focused mainly on sensory predictions of the 
motor system. Several studies have demonstrated that explicit agency judgments strongly 
depend on the comparison between a sensory expectation derived from efferent information 
and the actual sensory feedback following the self-generated movement (Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 2000; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). It has been 
suggested that the experience of agency for the sensory event emerges in cases where the 
action outcome matches the initial expectation.  
Another line of research, in contrast, ascribes a crucial role to expectations arising 
independent of the operation of the motor system (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 
1999). For example, it has been shown that inducing a representation of the sensory 
consequence prior to the action by means of priming enhances the conscious experience of 
agency (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005), even if efferent signals are absent (Wegner, 
Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Furthermore, this effect is present for supraliminal as well as 
subliminal primes, that is, no matter whether the prime stimulus is conscious or not (Linser & 
Goschke, 2007; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). 
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These proposed agency cues arising from different systems are not mutually exclusive, 
however. A current theoretical framework suggests that the brain’s agency system combines 
and integrates different cues depending on their relative reliabilities in certain contexts and 
depending on the level of agency registration (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009; 
Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). The present study aimed to test this hypothesis of 
optimal cue integration by comparing the impact of different types of sensory predictions at 
two levels of agency registration, at the implicit, sensorimotor level, and the explicit, higher-
order cognitive judgment level. It is important to note that most studies exclusively focus on 
higher cognitive levels of agency processing by measuring explicit judgments of agency only. 
This, however, does not do justice to the complex phenomenology of agency and to the fact 
that in our everyday lives, a non-reflective experience is more common than an explicit 
representation of selfhood. At least two different levels of agency representation can be 
distinguished, a reflective and a pre-reflective level, and it has been proposed that different 
cognitive cues are combined to establish one or the other representation (Synofzik, Vosgerau, 
& Newen, 2008). A measure that has been used to quantify the pre-reflective level of agency 
is self-specific sensory suppression, which refers to the fact that the sensory intensity of self-
generated events is lower than for external events (Bulot, Thomas, & Delevoye-Turrell, 2007; 
Sato, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). 
Sensory suppression is reflected for instance in the phenomenon that you cannot tickle 
yourself since self-produced tactile sensations are perceived as less intense as compared to the 
same sensations produced externally (Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; Blakemore, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 1999; Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003; Weiskrantz, Elliott, & Darlington, 
1971). Neuroimaging studies have found suppressed neural activity in sensory areas 
specifically in response to self-generated sensory input (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; 
Chapman, 1994; Curio, Neuloh, Numminen, Jousmaki, & Hari, 2000). Moreover, the N1 
component of the event-related potential (ERP) has been proven to reflect an early indicator 
of this self-specific sensory gating. In fact, there are a number of studies showing a reduction 
in N1 amplitude when a sound is self-generated as compared to when it is externally 
generated (Curio, Neuloh, Numminen, Jousmaki, & Hari, 2000; Ford et al., 2001; Houde, 
Nagarajan, Sekihara, & Merzenich, 2002; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005). Similarly, the 
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visual N1 has also been found to be sensitive to the distinction between self-causality versus 
external causality (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, in press; Schafer & Marcus, 1973).  
The explanation of sensory suppression is based on the idea of forward models of motor 
control generating predictions of the sensory consequences of a motor command, which are 
compared to the actual sensory feedback and removed in case of a match (Blakemore, Frith, 
& Wolpert, 1999; von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). This predictive mechanism serves to 
signal unexpected changes in the environment. It can further be used to distinguish self- from 
externally generated sensations, and therefore serves as an indicator of the sense of agency, in 
particular, at the pre-reflective level of agency. However, the precise nature of the predictions 
used to gate afferent sensory information with regard to the spatial, temporal and qualitative 
characteristics of the sensory event are still not clear (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003).  
The present study investigated how sensory predictions from different cognitive systems are 
integrated by the agency system depending on the specificity and reliability of each source of 
information. We measured N1 attenuation in the visual ERP to self-generated stimuli, as a 
marker for pre-reflective agency registration, as well as assessing the participants’ explicit 
perception of causality for those stimuli at the reflective level of agency experience. The mere 
presence of motor-related predictions was manipulated by having subjects generate a visual 
stimulus by key press as compared to passive observation of the same sensory event. In 
addition, the contingency between a specific type of action and a specific type of visual 
consequence was varied between high (75%) or low (50%) contingency so as to create 
contexts in which highly specific and precise motor-related predictions were available or not. 
Furthermore, sensory expectations independent of the motor system were induced by priming 
the visual action consequence prior to the action.  
According to the hypothesis of optimal cue integration (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008), the agency system should apply higher weight to the more reliable information 
sources. Therefore, we predicted that prime-induced expectation of the action consequence 
should enhance the sense of agency more strongly if no precise motor-related predictions are 
available. Furthermore, the nature of motor predictions underlying sensory suppression, that 
is, the precision, timescales and types of those predictions, is still under debate. While some 
studies have demonstrated that temporal proximity (Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; 
Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999) and precise spatial predictions (Blakemore, Frith, & 
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Wolpert, 1999) are important, other suggest that the mere presence of embodied (i.e., motor-
related) signals is sufficient, and proximity of the sensory event or precision of sensory 
predictions does not matter (Lange, 2011; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003). Hence, if sensory 
suppression indeed depends on the precision of forward models of the motor system, we 
should observe increased N1 attenuation in conditions of high as compared to low action-
effect contingency. 
2   Methods and materials 
2.1 Subjects 
Twenty-three healthy right-handed adults (20-32 years old, mean age 24 years, 11 female), 
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the after providing written informed 
consent, and in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2 Agency paradigm 
A combination of an agency judgment paradigm (Linser & Goschke, 2007) and a sensory 
suppression paradigm (Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005) was used, and the experiment 
consisted of three different tasks: the motor-effect (ME), the effect-only (E) and the motor-
only (M) task (see Fig. 5.1). In the ME task, a visual stimulus was generated by the 
participant’s action, whereas in the E task, the visual stimulus was externally generated and 
passively observed. By contrasting the ERP related to the visual stimulus in ME as compared 
to E, we aimed to quantify self-specific sensory suppression. The M task, in which the 
participant’s action did not produce a visual stimulus, served as a control to rule out motor 
activity as a possible confounding factor in the comparison between the ME and E task. 
In the ME task, participants responded to a target stimulus (circle or square, presented for 50 
ms) with a left or right key press according to a fixed stimulus-response mapping 
(counterbalanced across participants) without speed instruction. The key press triggered a 
visual effect stimulus (with a delay of 20 ms) which consisted of a set of three arrows (500 
ms) pointing either upwards or downwards. Visual stimuli were presented in black on a gray 
background subtending a visual angle of 0.5 x 2°. For each block of trials, participants were 
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asked to observe and judge the relation between their action (left or right key press) and the 




Figure 5.1.  Schematic representation of the sequence of events during the ME, M and E task; 
examples of an incongruent prime-effect relation are shown. 
 
The contingency between action and effect was varied; that is, the predictability of the type of 
effect stimulus on the basis of the action could be either high (75%) or low (50%). For 
example, in the high contingency condition, 75% of the up arrows were related to the left key 
and 25% to the right key (and vice versa for down arrows), whereas in the low contingency 
condition, up and down arrows were associated equally (50%) with both left and right key. 
This target-effect mapping was counterbalanced across participants. Importantly, we used 
priming in order to induce sensory anticipations prior to the action as a further experimental 
factor. Each trial started with the presentation of a mask stimulus (150 ms, composed of up 
and down arrows superimposed on each other) followed by the prime (40 ms) and another 
mask stimulus (20 ms). The prime stimulus was either identical to the future action effect 
(congruent priming) or consisted of arrows pointing in the opposite direction as the effect 
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stimulus (incongruent priming). The interstimulus interval between action effect and forward 
mask was randomized between 1200 and 1800 ms. Both experimental factors, priming and 
contingency, were varied in blocks of 40 trials and participants performed three blocks for 
each condition (high contingency: congruent and incongruent priming; low contingency: 
congruent and incongruent priming). After each block of trials, participants judged the causal 
relation between their action (left/right key press) and the subsequent effect (up/down arrow) 
on a visual analog scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (no relation) to 100 (perfect relation). In total, 
participants performed 12 blocks of the ME task. 
In the E task, participants passively watched the same visual stimuli used in the ME task, that 
is, without the instruction to press a key. The former effect stimuli were now externally 
generated by the computer with identical inter-stimulus timing as in the ME task. The factors 
contingency and priming were also varied in blocks of 40 trials, with a total of 12 blocks, as 
in the ME task. For each block, participants were asked to judge the causal relation between 
the target symbol (circle/square) and the subsequent effect stimulus (up/down arrows) on the 
same VAS ranging from 0 (no relation) to 100 (perfect relation). Thus, visual stimulation in E 
and ME was identical both in quality and in timing. 
In the M task, participants had to respond to target stimuli exactly as in the ME task, but no 
visual effect was delivered following the action. Nine blocks of 18 trials were presented, and 
no (VAS) judgment was required at the end of each block. The ERP response in the M task 
was later compared with the ERP response in the ME task. The order of the tasks was fixed 
across all participants: Two blocks of ME and E were followed by one block of M and by a 
three minute break after every 11 blocks (ME-E-M-ME-E-M-ME-E-M-ME-E-break). This 
sequence of experimental blocks was repeated three times. 
2.3 Prime processing & prime awareness tasks 
After the main experiment, participants performed a response priming task (duration 3 min.) 
to assess cognitive processing of the prime stimuli. The task consisted of speeded forced-
choice responses (left or right key press) to a target stimulus (up or down arrow). The target-
response mapping (e.g., up arrow – left key) was kept equal to the response-effect mapping 
(left key - up arrow, respectively) of the ME task. Targets were preceded by masked primes 
(up or down arrows), as in the ME task, which could be either congruent or incongruent in 
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relation to the target stimulus. Participants performed a random sequence of 60 congruent and 
60 incongruent trials. Differences in reaction times depending on prime congruency would 
indicate that primes were indeed processed.  
Prime awareness was first assessed using a subjective measure by systematically asking 
questions concerning the mask and target stimuli. Next, participants were informed of the 
nature of the prime stimulus and instructed to pay attention to the mask stimulus in order to 
perform a short forced-choice prime discrimination task as an objective measure of prime 
awareness. Trials consisted of masked prime stimuli only and participants were instructed to 
respond according to a fixed target-response mapping (e.g., up arrow – left key, down arrow – 
right key). Forty trials were presented, and primes appeared in random order. Prime visibility 
would be reflected in above-chance performance. 
2.4 Electrophysiological recording and data analysis 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 Ag-AgCl scalp electrodes (10-20 
system, BioSemi Active II system, BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). The electro-
oculogram (EOG) was obtained from electrodes placed external to the outer canthus of each 
eye and below and above the right eye. EEG and EOG signals were amplified and digitized 
online at a sampling rate of 512 Hz. Off-line data were re-referenced to average reference, 
low-pass filtered at 30 Hz and high-pass filtered at 0.75 Hz. All off-line analyses were 
performed using Brain Vision software (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany). 
Muscular and other non-stereotyped artifacts were excluded by visual inspection, stereotyped 
artifacts such as ocular and electrode artifacts were identified and removed using independent 
component analysis (ICA) (Jung et al., 2000).  
The continuous data were segmented from –200 to 400 ms relative to onset of the effect 
stimulus and baseline corrected over the pre-response interval (-200 to 0 ms). The segmented 
data were then averaged across trials for each experimental task (ME, E, M), priming 
condition (congruent and incongruent priming) and contingency condition (high and low 
contingency) within each participant. Only trials with correct responses were included in 
average ERPs. Furthermore, ERP waveforms locked to effect-stimuli in the ME task were 
corrected for possible motor contamination (due to concurrence of response- and effect-
related processes) by subtraction of activity in the M task. The corrected ERPs were used in 
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all subsequent analyses such that the influence of motor activity as a confounding factor could 
be ruled out in the comparison of the E and ME task. Similar correction procedures have been 
applied by previous ERP studies on sensory suppression (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, in 
press; Lange, 2011; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005). 
In our analysis of the average ERP, we focused on the N1 component and quantified its mean 
amplitude at fronto-centro-parietal electrode sites (FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, C4, CP3, CPz, 
CP4) in the 80 to 130 ms time interval following the onset of the effect stimulus. The N1 
component was selected for this analysis because it has been found to reflect self-specific 
suppression to auditory (Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005) as well as visual sensory events 
(Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, in press; Schafer & Marcus, 1973). 
2.5 Statistical Analyses 
For the ERP data, a 3-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run with the 
experimental factors task (2 levels: ME, E), anterior-posterior electrode location (3 levels: FC, 
C, CP) and lateral scalp location (3 levels: 3=left, z=midline, 4=right). Additional ANOVAs 
involving the factors contingency (2 levels: high, low) and priming (2 levels: congruent, 
incongruent) were conducted separately for the ME and E task. If data violated the sphericity 
assumption, Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. All measured amplitude values were 
tested for normal distribution with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For causality ratings in the 
ME and E task, separate 2-way repeated measures ANOVAs were run with contingency and 
priming as experimental factors. Response accuracy and reaction times in the response 
priming were analyzed using repeated measures ANOVAs with the factor prime-target 
relation (2 levels: congruent, incongruent). Response accuracy in the prime detection task was 
analyzed by a one-sample t-test to determine whether subjects performed above chance. Post-
hoc Tukey’s HSD tests were performed in case of significant ANOVA findings. 
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3   Results  
3.1 Causality judgments 
As a measure of the sense of agency at the reflective level, participants judged the causal 
relation between their key press and the type of visual effect stimulus on a VAS scale. The 




Figure 5.2.  Mean judgments of agency in the ME task (left) and causality in the E task (right), 
separately for priming and contingency conditions. 
 
Separate repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the ME and E task with the mean 
rating scores as the dependent variable involving the factors contingency (high, low) and 
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priming (congruent, incongruent). For the ME task, there was a significant main effect of 
contingency, F(1,22) = 88.73, p < .001, due to larger rating scores in blocks of high 
contingency (M=62.1, SEM=2.62) as compared to low contingency (M=32.9, SEM=2.16). In 
the E task, the ANOVA also yielded a significant main effect of contingency, F(1,22) = 
111.52, p < .001, with ratings being larger if contingency was high (M=61.7, SEM=2.88) as 
compared to low (M=32.2, SEM=2.38). The factor priming showed a significant influence in 
the ME task, F(1,22) = 7.58, p < .05, but only a trend effect in the E task, F(1,22) = 3.36, p = 
.08. That is, in the ME task, larger ratings were obtained for blocks of congruent priming 
(M=50.3, SEM=2.23) relative to incongruent priming (M=44.7, SEM=1.95), whereas in the E 
task, the difference between blocks of congruent and incongruent priming was less 
pronounced (M=48.5, SEM=2.36 vs. M=45.4, SEM=2.42). 
The factors contingency and priming did not interact in the ME task. However, in the E task, 
the ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect, F(1,22) = 5.08, p < .05. This was due to a 
trend effect of priming (congruent vs. incongruent) which was present only in blocks of high 
contingency [M=65.4, SEM=2.96 vs. M=57.9, SEM=3.28, p = .058] but not low contingency 
[M=31.5, SEM=2.76 vs. M=32.8, SEM=2.71, p = .96]. An overall ANOVA with the factors 
task, contingency and priming yielded a significant three-way interaction, F(1,22) = 5.39, p < 
.05. Post hoc comparisons revealed that the direction of interaction between contingency and 
priming was reversed in the ME task relative to the E task. That is, in the ME task, a trend 
effect of priming (congruent vs. incongruent) was present in blocks of low contingency 
[M=36.9, SEM=2.79 vs. M=28.9, SEM=2.37, p = .065] but not in blocks of high contingency 
[M=63.6, SEM=3.26 vs. M=60.5, SEM=2.76, p = .74]. 
Furthermore, it was analyzed whether performance measures in the ME task were influenced 
by the experimental factors contingency and priming. No significant differences in mean 
reaction time or error rate was found between blocks of high and low contingency (p > .3 and 
p > .4) or congruent and incongruent priming (p > .2 and p > .9); hence, they cannot account 
for the differences observed in the VAS ratings. 
3.2 Prime processing and prime awareness 
Analysis of reaction time and response accuracy data in the response priming task revealed 
that prime stimuli influenced the participants’ performance, confirming that primes were 
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indeed processed. That is, reaction times were faster to targets that were primed by a 
congruent stimulus (M=428ms, SEM=12.58) as compared to an incongruent stimulus 
[M=462ms, SEM=15.94; F(1,20) = 22.66, p < .001]. Correspondingly error rates were lower 
for congruent trials (M=4.6%, SEM=1.11) as compared to incongruent trials [M=9.9%, 
SEM=2.49; F(1,20) = 10.30, p < .01]. 
Subjective measures revealed that primes were invisible. None of the participants reported 
having seen the masked primes either spontaneously or when questioned about the nature of 
the mask and target stimuli at the end of the agency experiment. However, after informing 
participants about the prime stimulus and instructing them to pay attention to them, an 
objective measure of prime visibility revealed that participants were able to discriminate the 
prime stimuli. Specifically, in the prime detection task, participants performed a forced-choice 
judgment (left/right) on the masked primes (up/down arrows) and the rate of correct responses 
was tested against chance performance (50% correct) using a one-sample t-test. Across all 
participants, the analysis revealed a significant result, indicating that prime stimuli were 
identified correctly in 65% of the cases [t(22) = 3.72, p < .01]. Hence, according to an 
objective forced choice criterion, prime stimuli obviously reached participants’ awareness. 
That is, whereas under conditions of inattention, stimuli were invisible, they could be reported 
when participants’ attention was focused on them, which indicates supraliminal priming. 
3.3 Event-related potentials 
Figure 5.3 displays the effect-locked ERP waveforms obtained for E and ME task. The N1 
component is evident as a negative deflection peaking around 100 ms after onset of the effect 
stimulus, with a mid-central scalp distribution. The N1 wave appears to be larger in the E task 
as compared to the ME task. 
The mean ERP voltages were subjected to an initial three-way repeated measures ANOVA 
across all priming and contingency conditions in order to quantify the sensory suppression 
effect in the visual ERP. The factors included task, anterior-posterior electrode location and 
lateral scalp location. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of the factor task on the 
N1 component, F(2,44) = 5.4, p < .05, indicating smaller amplitudes in the ME as compared 
to the E task. This result replicates findings of self-specific N1 suppression in the auditory and 
visual modality. Further, the factor anterior-posterior electrode location had a significant 
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impact, F(2,44) = 3.96, p < .05, due to larger N1 amplitudes over fronto-central as compared 
to centro-parietal brain regions, p < .05. No effect of laterality was obtained and there was no 




Figure 5.3.  Stimulus-locked grand average ERPs during active generation of visual effects (ME task, 
dotted lines) and passive observation of externally generated visual effects (E task, solid lines) at 
electrodes FCz, Cz and Cpz, and scalp topographies of the voltage difference between E and ME task. 
 
In order to investigate the differential effects of priming and contingency on N1 amplitudes, 
separate ANOVAs were computed for the ME and E task, including the factors priming, 
contingency, anterior-posterior electrode location and laterality. Figure 5.4 shows grand-
average ERP waveforms for the ME task and the E task at electrode Cz as a function of 








Figure 5.4.  Grand average ERPs to visual effects preceded by congruent primes (dotted lines) or 
incongruent primes (solid lines), separately for conditions of high contingency (left) and low 
contingency (right) in the ME task (upper part) and E task (lower part) at the vertex electrode (Cz). 
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In the ME task, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of the factor priming on N1 
amplitude, F(1,22) = 8.25, p < .01, indicating smaller amplitudes for congruent as compared 
to incongruent priming. No interaction of priming and electrode location was observed, 
indicating that the effect of priming was present at all electrode sites. Furthermore, the main 
effect of contingency was not significant, F(1,22) = 0.91, p = .35; however, a significant 
interaction between contingency and anteriority-posteriority was observed, F(2,44) = 4.30, p 
< .05. This was due to the fact that N1 amplitudes were larger in blocks of low as compared to 
high contingency but only at fronto-central sites (p < .01), and not at central or centro-parietal 
sites. Priming and contingency did not interact significantly, F(1,22) = 0.08, p = .77, 
indicating that the effect of priming was present no matter whether contingency was high or 
low. 
For the E task, the ANOVA yielded no significant effect of the factor priming, F(1,22) = 2.15, 
p < .16, or of the factor contingency, F(1,22) = 0.83, p = .37. However, there was a significant 
interaction effect between priming and contingency, F(1,22) = 6.19, p < .05, indicating that 
congruent priming elicited smaller amplitudes than incongruent priming but only in blocks of 
high contingency (p > .05) and not in blocks of low contingency (p = .96). Furthermore, we 
observed a three-way interaction between priming, contingency and laterality, indicating that 
the difference between priming conditions in high contingency blocks was only present at 
midline electrodes (p < .001) and not at left and right sites. 
Together our results so far show N1 suppression of the visual ERP specifically to self-
generated stimuli (ME) relative to externally generated events (E). Further analyses showed 
N1 modulation by priming in the ME but not in the E task and N1 modulation by an 
interaction between priming and contingency in the E but not in the ME task. In order to test 
whether priming or contingency had an impact on the suppression effect, an ANOVA was 
performed with amplitudes of the difference waves between E and ME task centered at central 
electrode. However, neither the main effect of priming (p = .28) and contingency (p = .54) nor 
the interaction between both (p = .19) reached significance. 
4   Discussion 
Perceiving that the occurrence of a sensory event in the environment obviously depends on 
our actions will lead to an experience of agency and a feeling of control for this event. This 
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experience is immediate and remains mostly unconscious but we can become aware of it and 
explicitly judge whether we did or did not cause the event. It has been proposed that the sense 
of agency depends on the ability to make predictions about the sensory consequences of an 
action. The present study reveals that motor and nonmotor predictions are weighted 
differently depending on their reliability and depending on the level of agency processing. In 
the following, we will discuss our findings separately for the two levels of agency 
representation, the reflective and pre-reflective experience of agency. 
4.1 Reflective agency experience 
At the reflective level of agency, our results show that the agency system relies on prime-
induced sensory expectations in situations where no reliable and precise motor-related 
predictions of the action consequence are available. That is, participants judged the causal 
strength between action and effect to be larger when expectations of the upcoming action 
effect were induced by priming. However, this effect was present only if contingency between 
action and effect was low, meaning that the specific type of visual event could not be 
predicted based on the action. Hence, our data provides evidence for the hypothesis that 
optimal cue integration underlies the sense of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009). 
Nevertheless, despite the influence of nonmotor expectations, the explicit judgment of agency 
was most strongly modulated by precise motor predictions due to the contingency relation 
between the action and a specific sensory consequence. This is in line with studies showing 
that the contingency rule between a potential cause (i.e., action) and a specific effect is a 
major determinant for human causal learning and judged causality (Elsner & Hommel, 2004; 
Shanks & Dickinson, 1991). 
Our results seem to be inconsistent with some previous findings (Sato, 2009) suggesting 
additive effects of nonmotor and motor expectations. In the study by Sato (2009), participants 
performed a similar forced choice reaction task in which action effects were primed 
semantically, and were highly contingent (75% probability) upon the action or not (50% 
probability). Moreover, in this study, participants were told that the effect could either be 
caused by themselves or another person. Participants were then asked to judge their 
experience of authorship on a visual analogue scale. In contrast to our results, authorship 
judgments were more strongly enhanced by priming induced anticipations in conditions of 
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high action-effect contingency; that is, where precise motor predictions were available. An 
explanation for the discrepancy in results might be that the presence of another agent in the 
study by Sato (2009) created a context of increased uncertainty, whereas in our paradigm no 
other agent was involved. That is, in Sato’s low contingency condition, participants not only 
experienced the absence of reliable, precise motor-related predictions but also the presence of 
a potential alternative causal factor. Hence, it might be argued that there is a certain window 
of ambiguity regarding causality in which additional information is recruited to judge the 
cause of a sensory event. If certainty about causality is too high or too low, for example, due 
to the presence of several contextual or internal indicators, there is no need to rely on 
additional, alternative agency cues.  
This interpretation is supported by our data from the observational control condition (i.e., E 
task) in which no embodied signals (i.e., no efferent cues, and hence motor predictions) were 
available at all, and causality judgments had to be exclusively based on contingency rules 
involving external sensory events only. In this context, the perceived causality was also 
enhanced by prime-induced sensory expectations, although only in conditions of high 
contingency and not in conditions of low contingency. These results indicate that if embodied 
signals are absent and alternative contingency rules are not reliable, the perceived causality 
between events cannot be modulated further by additional predictive mechanisms. Together, 
our findings suggest that explicit judgments of causality are a function of sensory predictions 
derived from embodied signals, probabilistic contingencies and sensory preview weighted 
differently depending on their reliability and the degree of uncertainty in a given context. 
4.2 Pre-reflective agency experience 
Furthermore, we measured N1 attenuation as a means to examine the immediate, pre-
reflective level of agency representation. We replicated previous findings of reduced N1 
amplitudes specifically linked to self-generated stimuli (Curio, Neuloh, Numminen, Jousmaki, 
& Hari, 2000; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005; Schafer & Marcus, 1973) with the control 
that the temporal and spatial occurrence of the stimulus could also always be predicted based 
on visual cues in conditions in which the stimulus was externally produced. N1 amplitudes 
were further reduced by congruency between prime and effect stimulus, suggesting that 
nonmotor sensory expectations influence the pre-reflective level of agency registration, which 
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confirms findings of previous studies (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, in press; Moore, Wegner, 
& Haggard, 2009). This effect of prime-induced expectations did not depend on the precision 
of the internal forward model of the motor system. That is, effect priming modulated N1 
amplitudes in the presence of embodied signals (i.e., efferent information) independent of the 
specific relations between certain types of actions and sensory events. In other words, the 
mere presence of embodied signals seems to trump highly precise predictions based on 
specific contingency rules. In contrast, in the absence of embodied signals, the influence of 
prime-induced sensory expectations was much weaker, and in fact, was dependent upon 
additional contingency information, which mirrors our findings at the level of reflective 
causality judgments. 
Importantly, our data cannot support the notion that the amount of sensory suppression 
reflects the precision of forward model predictions of the motor system. N1 amplitudes were 
unaffected by whether or not the exact shape of the visual event following the action could be 
predicted on the basis of contingency information. In fact, current research in humans still 
lacks a clear understanding of the exact nature of the predictive and filtering mechanism 
behind self-specific sensory suppression. One line of evidence supports the view that the 
amount of attenuation is proportional to the discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory 
feedback (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; 
Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2002). Other studies, however, found sensory 
suppression even when the details of the sensory consequence, for example, in terms of its 
intensity or temporal occurrence, could not be precisely predicted based on the action (Lange, 
2011; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003).  
Recently, it has been proposed that there might be two separate mechanisms underlying 
sensory suppression, a fixed modulation of sensory input based on the mere presence of 
efference, and a proportional modulation based on precise predictions of a forward model if 
available (Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005). They argue that for the fixed 
“sensory bias”, an intention to act would be sufficient because the bias arises at early stages of 
action planning “before the precise details of the impending movement are determined” (p. 
393). Indeed, a recent study (Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert, 2006) showed that sensory 
suppression appears to rely on signals related to action preparation and not on the final motor 
command dispatched from the primary motor cortex. Hence, the attenuation of early N1 
amplitudes here might reflect this process of self/nonself distinction labeling an action and its 
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consequence as “mine” based on the mere presence of embodied signals, whereas the precise 
nature of the action consequence is evaluated later in sensory processing. This is consistent 
with ERP research on the visual mismatch negativity (MMN) showing that the detection of 
deviation from expected stimulus features is realized at later stages of sensory processing, in 
the latency range of the N2 component around 200 ms following a sensory event (Pazo-
Alvarez, Cadaveira, & Amenedo, 2003).  
Alternatively, one might argue that the extent to which highly accurate and precise predictive 
models are effective depends upon contextual factors (e.g., a noisy environment) and the type 
of sensory event. For example, for proximal, bodily sensory events which are in close relation 
to the effector, such as touch or speech, the level of specificity of the forward model might be 
higher regarding the intensity, temporal and spatial parameters of the event. Indeed, 
attenuation of self-administered tactile stimulation has been shown to strongly depend upon 
precise temporal and spatial predictions and proximity of the upcoming tactile sensation 
(Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999).  
In contrast, for distal, extracorporeal effects of actions such as sounds or visual stimuli 
produced by button presses, highly precise predictions might even be disadvantageous 
because of more variance or noise in the sensory outcome. For example, in the study by 
Tsakiris (2003), a participant’s key press caused a TMS pulse over the motor cortex which 
induced a finger twitch as the final somatic effect of the action. They found self-specific 
suppression to be unaffected by predictability of the stimulus intensity. Similarly, a recent 
study (Lange, 2011) showed that the amount of sensory suppression for sounds produced by 
key presses did not differ between predictable versus unpredictable sounds. That is, predictive 
models for distal sensory events involving external effectors (e.g., mechanical devices or 
another human actor) need to deal with differing and unknown intrinsic dynamics. Hence, due 
to potential delay, additional noise or nonlinearity in the expected outcome, predictions might 
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5   Conclusion  
In summary, our study provides evidence for the hypothesis that optimal cue integration 
underlies the sense of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009). The findings suggest 
that the sense of agency is based on different cues such as embodied signals, probabilistic 
contingency rules and sensory preview, which are combined in a way that each source of 
information is weighted differently depending on its reliability and the availability of 
alternative cues. We show that explicit judgments of agency are enhanced by sensory 
expectations arising from nonmotor systems. This influence was most strongly present in 
situations where no reliable and precise motor-related predictions of the action consequence 
were available and it further depended upon the general degree of uncertainty in a given 
context. However, despite the impact of nonmotor expectations, specific contingency rules 
between actions and effects were the major determinant of explicit causality perception. In 
contrast, sensory suppression as a pre-reflective marker of the sense of agency was modulated 
by nonmotor sensory expectations independent of precise internal forward models of the 
motor system. We conclude that the attenuation of neural responses to distal, extracorporeal 
action consequences is based primarily on embodied signals. The mere presence of efferent 
signals enables a first and immediate discrimination of sensory events as being self-caused or 
not, thereby mediating the primary, pre-reflective experience of “mineness” for a sensory 
event. This sensorimotor mechanism is then complemented further evaluation of the nature of 
the action consequence with respect to specific internal motor predictions as well as general 
beliefs about control so as to establish a strong experience of agency at higher cognitive 
levels. 
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Abstract 
Background: Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) lack the experience of 
action completion and agency. This subjective experience has been shown to depend on the 
integrity of predictions of action outcomes generated by forward models of the motor system. 
Motor predictions are critical for inhibitory gating of actions and their consequences, and 
abnormal activity in motor control circuits, including basal ganglia and premotor cortex, has 
been found in OCD. This is the first study explicitly investigating forward model mechanisms 
in OCD. 
Methods: To test whether inhibitory gating based on motor predictions is physiologically 
altered in OCD, we used electroencephalography to measure N1 suppression during active 
generation and passive observation of visual feedback in  
18 OCD patients and 18 healthy control subjects. Predictability of action feedback was 
manipulated on the basis of action and external cues, and simultaneous agency judgments 
were assessed. 
Results: OCD patients did not show the typical N1 suppression to actively generated 
feedback as compared to passively observed feedback. Moreover, in OCD patients, the N1 
was not modulated by additional predictive motor cues as observed in control subjects. If 
explicitly asked to report agency experience, enhanced estimations were found in patients, 
which correlated with the strength of incompleteness feelings.  
Conclusions: OCD patients fail to predict and suppress the sensory consequences of their 
own actions. The constant mismatch between expected and actual outcome caused by this 
forward model dysfunction may explain the persistent feeling of incompleteness even after 
properly executed actions and the obsessed searching for control in these patients. 
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1   Introduction 
The experience of completion and satisfaction associated with an action and its consequences 
is at the basis of perceiving ourselves as self-determined agents capable of causing and 
controlling events in our environment. In obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), a lack of 
agency is recognized as a central clinical feature and well documented in “not just right” 
experiences (Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Rheaume, 2003; Leckman, Walker, Goodman, Pauls, 
& Cohen, 1994) or an inner sense of imperfection and incompleteness (Pitman, 1987). 
Patients with OCD report, for example, that when actively closing a door, even though they 
know it is closed, the feeling remains that it may not be properly closed, and this is 
accompanied by the impulse to go back and double-check. The neurocognitive underpinnings 
of agency experience are extensively studied in schizophrenia (Frith, 2005; Heinks-
Maldonado et al., 2007; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010), however, 
to date there are no reports in OCD. 
One important signal for the sense of agency is thought to arise from motor control processes 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002), in particular, from forward models of the motor system 
(Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). These internal models generate predictions of the sensory 
consequences of an action which can be used for motor control (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 
2000; Wolpert, 1997): A comparison of predictions and intended outcome serves online 
monitoring of goal-achievement, whereas a comparison with the actual feedback provides a 
mechanism for filtering sensory input and for establishing a sense of agency (Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Frith, 2005; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). Several research lines have 
related these two comparators to distinct neural systems, in particular, a frontal-medial system 
monitoring attainment of “high-level” goals and a posterior-parietal system serving online, 
fine-tuned motor adjustments (Desmurget et al., 1999; Krigolson & Holroyd, 2006). A 
dysfunctional frontal-medial system (Endrass, Klawohn, Schuster, & Kathmann, 2008; 
Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Riesel, Endrass, Kaufmann, & Kathmann, 2011; Ursu, 
Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter, 2003) and functional abnormalities in brain regions 
underlying motor control (Greenberg et al., 2000; Mantovani et al., 2006; Yucel et al., 2007) 
have been consistently associated with OCD. However, no study has yet explicitly 
investigated the functional integrity of forward models in OCD. 
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The function of these internal forward model predictions can be explored by measuring 
predictive inhibitory gating in sensory processing. In healthy adults, self-generated sensory 
events are typically suppressed as compared to externally generated events due to a precise 
cancellation of afferent input by forward predictions (ie, corollary discharge) of the motor 
system (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Sperry, 1950; von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950; 
Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). This mechanism of sensorimotor gating underlies the capacity 
to discriminate accurately between self-produced and external stimulation and thereby 
contributes to the sense of agency. In human electrophysiological studies, sensory suppression 
has been observed as a reduction of the N1 component of the event-related potential (ERP) to 
self-generated as compared to passively experienced sounds (Curio, Neuloh, Numminen, 
Jousmaki, & Hari, 2000; Ford & Mathalon, 2004; Numminen, Salmelin, & Hari, 1999) or 
visual events (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, in press; Schafer & Marcus, 1973).  
Interestingly, imprecise motor predictions have been found in patients with schizophrenia and 
suggested to cause delusional misattribution of control to external agents (Frith, 2005). In 
OCD, in contrast, cognitive theories have postulated elevated responsibility to be at the core 
of the disorder, that is, an overestimation of personal causal influence on events that are in 
fact beyond control (Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1999; Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & 
Freeston, 1999). The contribution of sensorimotor cues to the formation of such high-level 
judgments of one’s own agency remains unclear. Recent models (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
Newen, 2008b) suggest that at low levels of agency registration, mechanisms of sensorimotor 
integration establish a pre-reflective experience of coherent sensory-motor flow and action 
completion. In contrast, at higher cognitive levels, an explicit judgment of agency is thought 
to be informed primarily by cognitive cues (eg, control and responsibility beliefs) and 
rationalization of sensory experiences. Therefore, in this view, ambiguous bottom-up sensory 
signals may not necessarily cause external misattribution of agency as proposed in the 
pathophysiology schizophrenia (Frith, 2005).  
In the present study, we aimed at testing whether OCD patients show alterations in predictive 
sensory gating by measuring N1 suppression in the visual ERP during active self-generation 
of visual events compared with passive observation of the same events. By varying the 
probabilistic contingency of action and outcome, and by priming the visual outcome prior to 
the action, this paradigm furthermore allowed us to examine the integrity of motor-related and 
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unrelated sensory predictions. Additionally, we analyzed explicit judgments of agency during 
the task. We hypothesized that gating of sensory information on the basis of motor predictions 
would be reduced in OCD patients, due to a dysfunctional system of motor control. Moreover, 
behavioral studies have shown that illusions of control and inflated responsibility in OCD 
may serve as compensatory mechanisms for restoring a threatened sense of control (Moulding 
& Kyrios, 2006; Reuven-Magril, Dar, & Liberman, 2008). Therefore, as opposed to 
schizophrenic misattributions of agency, judgments of agency in OCD were expected to be 
enhanced. 
2   Methods and Materials 
2.1 Subjects 
Eighteen patients with OCD and 18 age- and gender-matched healthy control subjects 
participated in the study (Table 6.1). Patients were recruited from the outpatient clinic for 
OCD at the Department of Clinical Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany. 
All patients met DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for OCD as the primary clinical diagnosis, which 
was examined by experienced clinicians using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
(SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). Further inclusion criteria were: (1) absence 
of alcohol or substance abuse or dependence; (2) absence of major internal or neurological 
disorders; (3) absence of psychotic symptoms; (4) being medication free or stable on their 
medication dose for at least 1 month. Thirteen patients were taking psychotropic medication 
(selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, SSRI; tri-/tetracyclic antidepressants, TCA/TeCA). 
Healthy control participants were included if they presented no evidence of current or past 
psychopathologic or neurologic disorders. All participants gave written informed consent to a 
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Table 6.1.  Demographical and Clinical Characteristics of OCD and Control Groups 
 OCD 
(n = 18) 
Control 
(n = 18) 
  
 Mean (SD) Mean SD X
2
(1) / t(36) p-value 
Demographic Data     
Age, y 35.4 (9.5) 37.4 (9.8) -0.60
b
 0.55 
Percent Female, % 33.3 (n/a) 33.3 (n/a) 0.00
a
 1.00 
Verbal IQ 109.8 (8.9) 107.4 (10.6) 0.75
b
 0.46 
Clinical Characteristics     
Onset of illness, y 18.5
c 
(7.2) n/a n/a n/a 





 (7.3) n/a n/a n/a 
STAI-T 39,7 (12.3) 34.7 (8.6) 1.41
b
 0.17 
STAI-S 47.0 (13.6) 35.5 (11.7) 2.68
b
 0.01 





(6.3) n/a n/a n/a 
Y-BOCS, Obsessions 8.9 (2.9) n/a n/a n/a 
Y-BOCS, Compulsions 7.9 (3.9) n/a n/a n/a 
OC-TCDQ,     
harm avoidance 8.2 (4.2) n/a n/a n/a 
incompleteness 12.2 (6.5) n/a n/a n/a 
 No. (%)    
Medication at study time     
Medication free (>4 wk) 5 (27.8)    
Paroxetine (SSRI) 6 (33.3)    
Citalopram (SSRI) 3 (16.7)    
Escitalopram (SSRI) 2 (11.1)    
Trimipramin (TCA) with SSRI 1 (5.6)    
Mirtazapin (TeCA) 1 (5.6)    
 
Abbreviations: BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; MADRS, Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating 
Scale; OCI-R, Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised; STAI-S/T, Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
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Inventory-State/Trait Form; Y-BOCS, Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale; OC-TCDQ, 
Obsessive-Compulsive Trait Core Dimension Questionnaire; NA, not applicable; SSRI, selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor; TCA/TeCA, tri-/tetracyclic antidepressant. 
a chi-square test; b independent samples t test; c assessed in 16 OCD patients. 
 
2.2 Questionnaires 
To assess severity and characteristics of OCD psychopathology, we administered the Yale-
Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS)(Goodman et al., 1989) and the Obsessive-
Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R)(Foa et al., 2002). Depressive symptoms were 
assessed using the Montgomery-Asberg-Depression Rating Scale (Montgomery & Asberg, 
1979) and the Beck-Depression-Inventory (BDI-II)(Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). In addition, 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushere, 1970) was 
administered to assess state and trait level anxiety. Feelings of incompleteness and harm 
avoidance related to obsessions or compulsions were assessed using the Obsessive-
Compulsive Trait Core Dimension Questionnaire (OC-TCDQ )(Summerfeldt, Kloosterman, 
Parker, Antony, & Swinson, 2001). Verbal intelligence was measured by a German 
vocabulary test (Schmidt & Metzler, 1992). 
2.3 Agency Paradigm 
Participants performed a modified version of an agency paradigm that has been described in 
detail elsewhere (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, in press) and which consisted of three different 
tasks (see Figure 6.1). 
In a motor-effect task (ME task), subjects self-triggered a visual effect stimulus (red or blue 
square) with a left or right key press according to a fixed target-response mapping without 
speed instruction. During blocks of high action-effect contingency, in 75% of the trials, a 
particular effect-stimulus (eg, blue) appeared when a particular key was pressed (eg, left key); 
in the remaining 25% of the trials the other effect-stimulus appeared (eg, red). During blocks 
of low action-effect contingency, both effect-stimuli were associated equally (50%) with both 
left and right key presses. Participants’ made judgments of the causal relation between their 
action and the effect on a visual analog scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (no relation) to 100 
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(perfect relation) after 40 trials of one experimental block had been completed. In addition, 
prior to each key press, a semantic prime stimulus was presented. That is, each trial began 
with the presentation of a prime stimulus (consisting of the words “BLUE” [German: 
“BLAU”] or “RED” [German: “ROT”]) followed by a mask stimulus (composed of a 
meaningless letter string, XZXZXZ). The relation between prime and effect was either 
congruent or incongruent depending on whether prime and effect denoted the same or 
different colors. The factor priming (congruent, incongruent) was realized in blocks of 40 




Figure 6.1.  Schematic representation of the sequence of events during the ME, M and E task; 
examples of a congruent prime-effect relation are shown. 
 
In an effect-only task (E task), participants merely watched the visual effect stimulus without 
performing a key press, and were instructed to judge the causal relation between a particular 
target symbol (“#” or “+”) and the subsequent effect stimulus (red or blue square). All other 
features remained the same as in the ME task, including prime-effect relations and target-
effect contingencies. The E task was carried out to compare cortical responses during passive 
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observation versus self-generation of sensory events in order to measure self-specific sensory 
suppression. The ME task and E task consisted of 320 trials each, presented in eight blocks of 
40 trials (two blocks per contingency x priming condition).  
In a motor-only task (M task), visual stimulation and participants’ responses were the same as 
in the ME task, except that no visual effect stimulus followed the key press and no causality 
judgment had to be performed. This condition served to obtain and remove motor activity as a 
possible confounding factor in the comparison between the ME and E task. The M task 
consisted of 160 trials presented in four blocks of 40 trials each. The order of the tasks was 
fixed across all participants: Two alternating blocks of ME and E were followed by one block 
of M task. This sequence of blocks (ME-E-ME-E-M) was repeated four times. To familiarize 
participants with the tasks and with causality judgments, they completed two high 
contingency blocks of ME and E prior to EEG recording. The total duration of the agency 
judgment experiment was 45 minutes. 
2.4 EEG Recording and ERP Analysis 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was acquired from 61 channels using Brain Vision 
Recorder software (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany), with a 250 Hz sampling rate 
and the vertex electrode (Cz) as recording reference. Impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. 
Off-line EEG signals were re-referenced to average reference and subjected to a 0.75-30 Hz 
band-pass filter. Artifact correction was carried out by manual rejection and independent 
component analysis (Jung et al., 2000). Only trials with correct button presses occurring 200-
1500 ms after the target stimuli (99% of the total trials) were included in the analysis. 
Stimulus-locked epochs were extracted from the continuous data, baseline corrected over the 
pre-response interval (-200 to -100 ms), and averaged separately for each participant, 
condition and site. To cancel out movement-related potentials in the ME task, difference 
waves were calculated by subtracting the ERPs in the M task from the ERPs in the ME task. 
This procedure allowed the direct comparison of ERPs in the E and ME task for measuring 
self-specific sensory suppression ruling out motor activity as a confounding factor (Gentsch & 
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Our main electrocortical dependent measure was the amplitude of the N1 component. Because 
the visual N1 was noted to include functionally separable anterior and posterior 
subcomponents (N1a and N1p) with different latencies (Vogel & Luck, 2000), distinct 
measurement windows and sites were chosen. The N1 was quantified as the mean amplitude 
within the 80-130 ms time window at the vertex (Cz; for N1a), and within the 140-200 ms 
time window at occipito-parietal sites (O1, O2, PO3, PO4; for N1p). 
2.5 Statistical Analyses 
For causality ratings in the ME task and E task, separate mixed 2 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) were run with group (OCD patients, controls) as the between-subject factor and 
contingency (high, low) and priming (congruent, incongruent) as within-subject factors. For 
the ERP data, a mixed 5-way ANOVA was run with the between-subjects factor group (OCD 
patients, controls) and within-group factors task (ME, E), contingency (high, low), priming 
(congruent, incongruent) and electrode site. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied 
in cases that the data violated the sphericity assumption. Post hoc Newman-Keuls tests were 
performed in cases of significant ANOVA findings. Associations between sensory 
suppression effects and symptom measures or agency judgments were examined by Pearson 
product-moment correlations. 
3   Results 
3.1 Demographic and Clinical Characteristics 
Demographic data and clinical characteristics are summarized in Table 6.1. Groups did not 
differ significantly with respect to age, gender and verbal intelligence. OCD patients were 
characterized by a mild to moderate level of OCD symptoms (as indicated by YBOCS scores) 
and, on average, subclinical levels of depressive symptoms. 
3.2 Agency Judgments 
To evaluate whether groups differed in their explicit judgments of agency, VAS ratings were 
analyzed. Figure 6.2 shows the mean rating scores in the ME and E condition. A mixed 
ANOVA with group, task, priming condition and contingency condition was conducted. 
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Ratings of causality across patients and control subjects were significantly higher when 
effects were expected in conditions of high contingency and congruent priming as compared 
to low contingency (F1,34=99.67; P<.001) and incongruent priming (F1,34=8.34; P=.007). 
Patients’ ratings of agency and causality were marginally higher (mean [SD], 38.3 [13.3]) 
than those of control subjects (mean [SD], 30.3 [13.7]; F1,34=3.67; P=.06).  
To evaluate group differences specifically for agency judgments during self-generation of 
visual effects, a separate ANOVA for the ME task was conducted. Patients and control 
subjects differed marginally in the impact of prime induced anticipations on agency 
judgments, depending on the level of contingency (F1,34=3.09; P=.08). Post hoc Newman-
Keuls tests revealed that control participants showed higher agency ratings after congruent 
than incongruent priming only in blocks of high contingency (P=.003; mean [SD], 53.2 [19.1] 
vs 39.9 [19.3]) but not low contingency (P=.81; mean [SD], 12.8 [12.3] vs 11.8 [11.7]). In 
contrast, agency ratings of patients with OCD remained unaffected by priming in both the 
high (P=.84; mean [SD], 54.1 [20.9] vs 53.3 [15.3]) and low contingency (P=.46; mean [SD], 




Figure 6.2.  Mean judgments of agency in the ME task (left) and causality in the E task (right) for the 
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3.3 Event-Related Potentials 
ERP results are presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. The ANVOA examining N1p amplitudes 
revealed a significant main effect of task (F1,34=23.39; P<.001), indicating self-specific 
suppression of the N1p component. That is, N1p amplitudes were smaller for self-generated 
effects (ie, in the motor-effect task) than for externally generated effects (ie, in the effect-only 
task). Furthermore, the effect of task depended upon contingency and, most importantly, the 
effect differed across groups, as reflected in significant interactions of task x contingency 
(F1,34=9.91; P<.01) and task x group (F1,34=10.36; P<.01). Post-hoc Newman-Keuls tests were 
performed to further explore these findings. Whereas in control participants the effect of task 
on N1p amplitudes was highly significant (P<.001), patients with OCD showed no self-
specific N1 suppression (P=.26), as can be seen in Figure 6.4. Moreover, the N1p amplitudes 
in high as compared to low contingency conditions were found to be suppressed for self-
generated effects (P=.02), and a tendency for the reverse pattern was present for externally 
generated effects (P=.06). 
On the basis of an a priori hypothesis that postulated abnormal motor predictions in patients 
with OCD, the contingency x task interaction was further parsed with separate follow-up 
ANOVAs for each group. In the control group, there was a significant interaction of task x 
contingency (F1,17=7.42; P=.01), indicating that N1p was modulated by contingency in the 
motor-effect condition (p=.02) but not in the effect-only condition (P=.21), with smaller 
amplitudes reflecting sensory suppression in high compared to low contingency conditions. In 
contrast, in patients with OCD, the interaction of task x contingency was not significant 
(F1,17=0.01; P=.96), reflecting the fact that N1p amplitudes did not differ between high and 
low contingency conditions for either self-generated effects (P=.60) or externally generated 













Figure 6.3.  Grand average ERPs at electrodes O1 and O2 during active generation of visual effects 
(left) and passive observation of externally generated visual effects (right), in the two conditions high 
contingency (upper part) and low contingency (lower part), for healthy comparison subjects (blue) and 
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Figure 6.4.  Means and standard deviations of the N1 amplitude within the 140-200 ms time window 
at occipito-parietal electrode sites (O1, O2, PO3, PO4), separately for the ME task (light gray bars) 
and E task (dark gray bars), contingency conditions (high and low) and groups (OCD patients and 
controls).  
 
No main effect of group was found (F1,34=2.32; P=.14). Hence, relative to control participants, 
patients with OCD had comparable N1p amplitudes. To further explore the possibility of a 
general hyperexcitability to sensory stimulation the data were analyzed for each task 
separately. In the motor-effect task, there was a significant effect of group (F1,34=4.62; P=.04). 
That is, N1p amplitudes to self-generated effects were significantly smaller in the control 
group as compared to the patient group, as can be seen in Figure 6.3. During the effect-only 
task, although it appears that the groups differed in N1 amplitudes, no significant group 
difference was present (F1,34=0.62; P=.44). This demonstrates that the group difference in 
self-specific N1p suppression is due to a specific difference in the processing of sensory 
stimulation resulting from motor action and not by a general hyperexcitability to sensory 
stimulation in patients.  
No effects involving the factor priming were found at the level of N1p component. 
Furthermore, the analysis of N1 amplitudes at anterior electrode sites revealed no significant 
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effects involving group or task (all F<1.98; all P>.17), indicating that N1a amplitudes did not 
differ between patients and controls nor between self- and externally generated effects. 
3.4 Correlations between the Sense of Agency and OCD Characteristics 
Pearson correlation analyses and partial correlations controlling for depression (BDI-II) and 
anxiety (STAI-S) ratings were performed between measures of the sense of agency and 
clinical characteristics in OCD patients. Positive correlations emerged between mean agency 
judgments in the ME task and (1) OCI-R “Ordering” score (r=.74, P<.001; partial r=.76, 
P=.003) and (2) OC-TCDQ subtotal for incompleteness (r=.61, P=.007; partial r=.54, P=.05). 
That is, the more OCD Ordering symptoms and sensations of incompleteness a patient had, 
the higher the agency judgments.  
4   Discussion 
4.1 Electrocortical Index of Agency 
The present study found aberrant sensory gating during processing of action outcomes in 
patients with OCD. Specifically, instead of showing the suppression of posterior N1 to self-
generated visual events that was observed in control participants, individuals with OCD did 
not distinguish between self and externally generated visual events at these early stages of the 
information processing flow. Research has revealed that sensory suppression results from 
forward model predictions of the motor system precisely canceling out the sensory effects 
induced by action (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; 
Sperry, 1950; von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). Within this context of research, the lack of 
suppression exhibited by patients indicates deficient internal motor predictions, which may 
explain the tendency of individuals with OCD to continuously register error signals and to 
experience dissatisfaction in outcome processing (Pitman, 1987; Schwartz, 1997). In line with 
this interpretation, the present findings further revealed that N1 suppression in control 
participants was larger when precise motor predictions were available as it were the case in 
conditions of high action-effect contingency. In contrast, in patients with OCD, N1 
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Interestingly, impaired sensory gating in OCD during movement together with enhanced 
responsiveness to sensory stimuli in OCD patients has been described by a recent study using 
somatosensory evoked potentials (Rossi et al., 2005). However, due to a general enhancement 
of cortical activation also in the non-movement condition, the authors argued that cortical 
hyperexcitability might have caused the inability to modulate sensory input in OCD. Hence, 
from these findings it remained unclear which role forward model mechanisms may play in 
deficient inhibitory gating of sensory input in OCD patients. In the present study, in contrast, 
the difference in N1 amplitudes between patients and controls was specific to conditions 
involving actions, ruling out unspecific sensory hyperexcitability as a possible explanation. 
Moreover, the present study not only extends the prior finding by Rossi et al. (2005) by 
clarifying the mechanism underlying the reduced sensory gating in OCD but also shows for 
the first time a lack of sensory suppression for distal, not proximal effects in the context of 
instrumental action. The capacity for instrumental action lies at the heart of agentive self-
awareness. 
Motor prediction as reflected in sensory gating of action consequences has been shown to rely 
on an efference copy, a signal generated in cortical areas involved in motor preparation (Voss, 
Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert, 2006), such as the supplementary motor area (SMA) (Haggard 
& Whitford, 2004) and premotor cortex (Berti et al., 2005). The efferent signal is fed into an 
internal forward model eliciting a perceptual expectation, a so-called corollary discharge, used 
in cortical and subcortical areas to modulate perceptual processing during action (eg, in 
somatosensation, Christensen et al., 2007; eg, in vision, Wurtz, McAlonan, Cavanaugh, & 
Berman, 2011). Hyperactivity of the SMA and premotor areas is a prominent feature in the 
neurobiology of OCD (Greenberg et al., 2000; Yucel et al., 2007). There is evidence that 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation to the SMA improves clinical symptoms of OCD 
patients (Mantovani et al., 2006). Hence, it can be speculated that, in OCD, abnormal cortical 
activity in the SMA might impair the formation of precise corollary discharge and the fine-
tuning of associated sensorimotor integration. 
Forward model predictions are utilized by the motor control system for adjusting movements 
online based on goal achievement, and this is monitored by frontal and posterior control 
systems (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Krigolson & Holroyd, 2006). 
While the posterior error detection system is thought to depend on the integration of sensory 
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inflow and motor predictions, the frontal error detection system compares high-level goal 
representations and motor predictions. Several lines of evidence implicate dysfunctional 
performance monitoring in frontomedial regions in the pathophysiology of OCD (Gehring, 
Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Riesel, Endrass, Kaufmann, & Kathmann, 2011; Ursu, Stenger, 
Shear, Jones, & Carter, 2003). Our results extend these findings by suggesting a dysfunction 
also in the posterior error detection system, which is critically involved in online motor 
adjustments.  
Imprecise sensory predictions in OCD cannot serve the function of canceling and filtering 
self-produced sensory feedback and in this way may cause a constant mismatch in the 
comparison between expected and actual sensory outcome of a body movement. These 
mismatch signals might be related to sensory phenomena in OCD such as feelings of 
incompleteness and persistent internal error signals even during correctly executed actions. 
Furthermore, due to impairments in this particular mechanism of motor control, OCD patients 
should also show deficits in fine-tuned predictive motor adjustments. This prediction might be 
tested in future investigations recording movement kinematics, for example, during 
visuomotor conflict, in order to explore the exact link between the observed sensory gating 
deficits and compulsive behavior in OCD. 
4.2 Conscious Agency Judgment  
Despite impairments at the sensorimotor level of agency, patients’ explicit judgments of 
agency depended on motor predictions as strongly as those of controls. The finding of 
increased agency judgments in patients is in line with research suggesting an illusory sense of 
control in OCD and may reflect a compensation for the distorted feeling of agency (Moulding 
& Kyrios, 2006; Reuven-Magril, Dar, & Liberman, 2008). Recent cognitive theories of OCD 
emphasize that the appraisal of experiences in individuals with OCD is characteristically 
determined and biased by inflated beliefs of special personal responsibility (eg, Rachman, 
2002). When considered within this theoretical framework, the observed enhancement of 
explicit agency judgments in patients may reflect the hyperactivity of a cognitive system 
evaluating the need for personal engagement during exposure to ambiguous sensory signals 
associated with actions. Cognitive theories further propose that an important self-perpetuating 
mechanism in OCD consists of engagement in neutralizing (compulsive) behavior that 
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produces a further increment in perceived responsibility (Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1999). 
Interestingly, our correlation analyses revealed that the conscious experience of agency 
increased with the level of incompleteness feelings as assessed with the OC-TCDQ 
(Summerfeldt, Kloosterman, Parker, Antony, & Swinson, 2001) and with the presence of 
“Ordering” symptoms as measured with the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002). Further work is needed 
to elucidate the interrelation between processes of sensorimotor integration, behavioral 
adjustment and explicit control beliefs. 
Consistent with previous studies, healthy controls benefited from prime-induced expectations 
(Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Sato, 2009), specifically in conditions of high contingency. 
The lack of prime influence on agency experience in individuals with OCD symptoms is 
consistent with recent reports (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2010). It indicates that cue 
integration at the sensorimotor level and weighting at the judgment level of the sense of 
agency is different in OCD. It might be speculated that due to “noisy” bottom-up 
sensorimotor signals and the resulting compensatory increase in agency judgment based on 
explicit control beliefs, patients are less inclined to rely on additional implicit, sensorimotor 
based cues.  
The typical and most extensively discussed pathology involving a disruption of agency 
experience are delusions of control in schizophrenia, which have straightforwardly been 
explained by dysfunctional motor prediction and sensorimotor gating (Frith, 2005; Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). In comparison to this research, our findings, however, confirm 
the notion that comparator mechanisms based on motor predictions are not sufficient to 
explain the content of conscious reflections and attributions of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, 
& Newen, 2008a). Our results demonstrate that a disturbed feeling of agency can express 
itself differentially at higher cognitive levels of agency processing. According to recent views 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b), the formation of agency judgments relies on 
conscious rationalization processes at higher cognitive levels by integrating  bottom-up 
sensory signals and prior beliefs, learning history and context perception. In schizophrenia, 
the noisy sensory input seems to be integrated into a cognitive system of biased beliefs and 
delusions (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007), whereas in OCD, it may inform a system 
searching for conscious control (Moulding & Kyrios, 2006) and motivate behavioral 
strategies for regaining control over external events. 
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1.1. The comparator model of the sense of agency. This model is based on a 
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and the actual state. During action, a forward model based on action-related 
signals predicts the sensory consequences of the action. This sensory 
prediction is used for online control of movements (comparator 1) and for 
cancellation of sensory input that is self-produced (comparator 3). The actual 
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1.2. The account of an optimal cue integration underlying the sense of agency. 
This framework assumes that a combination and integration of multiple cues 
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3.1. (A) Mean agency judgments in the ME task and (B) mean causality 
judgments in the E task as a function of prime effect relation (congruent, 
dotted line; incongruent, solid line). Conditions of high contingency (75%) 
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difference between E and ME tasks, separately for the three priming 
conditions. (C), Grand-average ERPs for the E task (red), ME task (blue), M 
task (green) and ME minus M task (black) for the vertex electrode (Cz). 
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6.2. Mean judgments of agency in the ME task (left) and causality in the E task 
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